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ABSTRACT This paper reports a formal symbolic process virtual machine (FSPVM) denoted as 
FSPVM-E for verifying the reliability and security of Ethereum-based services at the source code level of 
smart contracts. A Coq proof assistant is employed for programming the system and for proving its 
correctness. The current version of FSPVM-E adopts execution-verification isomorphism, which is an 
application extension of Curry-Howard isomorphism, as its fundamental theoretical framework to 
combine symbolic execution and higher-order logic theorem proving. The four primary components of 
FSPVM-E include a general, extensible, and reusable formal memory framework, an extensible and 
universal formal intermediate programming language denoted as Lolisa, which is a large subset of the 
Solidity programming language using generalized algebraic datatypes, the corresponding formally 
verified interpreter of Lolisa, denoted as FEther, and assistant tools and libraries. The self-correctness of 
all components is certified in Coq. FSPVM-E supports the ERC20 token standard, and can automatically 
and symbolically execute Ethereum-based smart contracts, scan their standard vulnerabilities, and verify 
their reliability and security properties with Hoare-style logic in Coq.  
INDEX TERMS Blockchain, theorem proving, distributed systems, security, verification  
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION
Blockchain [1] is one of the emerging technologies 
developed to address a wide range of disparate problems, 
such as those associated with cryptocurrency [2] and 
distributed storage [3]. Recently, Blockchain-as-a-Service 
(BaaS), where blockchain services are obtained from third-
party providers, has established a strong market presence, 
and is a promising means of utilizing the blockchain 
technology. Organizations like Oracle, Microsoft, and IBM 
have launched BaaS offerings. Many BaaS offerings are 
based on or have been inspired by the Ethereum platform 
[4], which is one of the most powerful 2.0 blockchain 
platforms presently available. For example, Amazon 
partnered with Kaleido to offer cloud services on which to 
host an Enterprise Ethereum-based architecture. That makes 
Kaleido the first managed BaaS offering that is available on 
Amazon web service (AWS) regions across the world. 
While BaaS is certainaly a rapidly emerging service, the 
continued rapid development of BaaS is limited by security 
issues like those affecting Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) 
products. Presently, one of the security issues of greatest 
interest for researchers is the reliability and security of 
blockchain smart contracts. Here, blockchain smart contracts 
are script programs that provide a kind of special digital 
contract where the code is the law, which enables blockchain 
transactions to be conducted automatically [5]. One of the 
challenges that must be confronted in the development of 
secure and reliable smart contracts is that the programming 
process for these programs differs from that of conventional 
programs. Here, the source code of smart contracts must 
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represent legal considerations in a manner similar to contracts 
written in natural languages. Therefore, obligations and terms 
should be presented in smart contracts explicitly. However, 
smart contract developers are generally programmers, rather 
than legal experts, and their grasp of legal obligations and 
terms is secondary to their grasp of programming. As a result, 
the programming habits of programmers introduce legal 
loopholes in smart contracts. These loopholes introduce many 
classes of subtle bugs in smart contracts, ranging from 
transaction-ordering dependencies to mishandled exceptions 
[6], that differ significantly from common bugs because, 
while common bugs are easily detected owing to faulty 
program execution, these legal loopholes can result in 
unintended operations, and can also be maliciously exploited 
to circumvent obligation limitations without affecting the 
normal execution of the contract procedure, and ultimately 
result in direct economic loss to users. For example, some of 
the largest and best known attacks on smart contracts 
involved those based on the Ethereum platform, such as the 
attack on the decentralized autonomous organization (DAO) 
[7] and the Parity wallet attack [8]. A partial summary of 
Ethereum-based smart contract attacks are listed in Table 1, 
which indicates that Ethereum attack cases have already 
resulted in the loss of billions of dollars worth of virtual 
currency. Moreover, due to the unique feature of these 
vulnerabilities, standard software engineering techniques 
employing such static and dynamic analysis tools as 
Manticore (https://github.com/trailofbits/manticore) and 
Mythril (https://mythx.io/) have not yet been proven to be 
effective at increasing the security and reliability of smart 
contracts. Thus, an urgent need exists for a verification and 
validation technology that can guarantee the security and 
reliability of Ethereum-based services in the most rigorous 
manner available. 
TABLE 1 
PARTIAL SUMMARY OF RECENT ETHEREUM-BASED SMART CONTRACT 
ATTACK CASES 
Attack Date Contract Name Result 
06/17/2016 The DAO 3.6 million ETH lost [7] 
07/19/2017 Parity 150 thousand ETH lost [8] 
11/06/2017 Parity 500 thousand ETH frozen 
04/22/2018 BEC Crashed to zero value
1
 
04/26/2018 SMT 16 million SMT lost
2
 
05/24/2018 EDU Crashed to zero value 
05/24/2018 BAI Crashed to zero value 
06/16/2018 ICX All ICX frozen
3
 
A brief comparison of existing verification and validation 
technologies is presented in the Table 2. We note from this 
table that formal verification is the only technology that 
 
1
 BEC: https://medium.com/@peckshield/alert-new-batchoverflow-bug-in-
multiple-erc20-smart-contracts-cve-2018-10299-511067db6536 
2
SMT: https://medium.com/wolf-crypto/batchoverflow-erc20-vulnerability-
5691e42940de 
3
 ICX: https://medium.com/@tozex/cryptoasset-industry-problems-smart-
contract-security-challenge-cb6aee69d5ef 
satisfies both reliability and completeness simultaneously. 
Hence, formal verification is one of the most rigorous 
theoretical technologies available for ensuring the security 
and reliability of software systems. Consequently, the 
Ethereum community has focused on the formal verification 
of smart contracts, issuing open calls for formal verification 
proposals [9] as part of what has been described as a “push 
for formal verification” [10]. 
While formal verification is a rigorous approach, different 
formal verification technologies have their own peculiar 
strengths and weaknesses. Among these, higher-order logic 
theorem proving is one of the most rigorous and flexible 
technologies for verifying the properties of programs. 
However, numerous problems regarding reusability, 
consistency, and automation have been encountered when 
applying theorem-proving technology to program verification 
[11]. Moreover, the process of model checking is only 
applicable to finite state programs. In addition, a number of 
well-known frameworks and tools, focused on Solidity 
bytecode on the Ethereum virtual machine (EVM) platform, 
have been developed recently for the verification of Ethereum 
smart contracts by symbolic execution. For example, the 
formal semantic known as KEVM was developed for the 
formal low-level programming verification of EVM using the 
K-framework [12]. Since KEVM is executable, it can run the 
validation test suite provided by the Ethereum foundation. 
Similarly, a Lem [13] implementation of EVM provides an 
executable semantics of EVM for the formal verification of 
smart contracts at the bytecode level.  Grishchenko et al.'s 
[14] and Amani et al.'s [15] applied F* and Isabell/HOL to 
abstractly formalize the semantics of EVM bytecode. 
Unfortunately, few of these works formalized the syntax and 
semantics of Solidity source code, and verified the 
compilation process from Solidity to respective bytecode. 
Oyente (https://www.comp.nus.edu.sg/˜loiluu/ oyente.html) is 
an EVM symbolic execution engine written in Python 
supporting most of the EVM opcodes. Several heuristics-
based drivers of the symbolic execution engine are built into 
the tool for finding common bugs in EVM programs. 
However, these heuristics may introduce false positives in 
many cases, and they have not been rigorously proven to 
accurately capture their bug classes. In addition, it must be 
noted that most of the many recent tools based on symbolic 
execution adopt model checking technology as their 
foundation, and few are developed in a higher-order logic 
theorem proving system to enable real-world programs to be 
symbolically executed. In addition, conventional symbolic 
execution approaches also suffer from limitations such as 
path explosion, where the number of feasible paths in a 
program grows exponentially, program-dependent efficiency, 
and memory, environment, and constraint solving problems 
[16]. Moreover, nearly all of these methods have high 
learning thresholds. These problems obstruct formal 
verification technologies from being applied commercially. 
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TABLE 2 
COMPARISONS OF DIFFERENT VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION 
TECHNOLOGIES 
Technology Reliability Completeness 
Traditional code testing Reliable Non-complete 
Symbolic execution Reliable Non-complete 
Traditional static analysis Unreliable Non-complete 
Formal verification Reliable Complete 
 
One of the most important features of the Ethereum 
platform is that it implements a general-purpose Turing-
complete programming language denoted as Solidity that 
allows for the development of arbitrary applications and 
scripts that can be executed in the EVM to conduct 
blockchain transactions automatically. However, most 
prominent studies have focused on the formal verification of 
the bytecode of the EVM, and the development of high-level 
formal specifications for Solidity and relevant formal 
verification tools has attracted considerably less interest 
despite its importance in programming and debugging smart 
contract software. Although some intermediate specification 
languages between Solidity and EVM bytecode have been 
developed, such as Scilla [17], Simplicity [18] and Bhargavan 
et al.'s [19], the Solidity syntax and semantics have not been 
formalized in a manner that is consistent with official 
documentation. However, the formal syntax and semantics of 
programming languages actually play a crucial role in several 
areas of computer science, particularly in program 
verification. For advanced programmers and compiler 
developers, formal semantics provide a more precise 
alternative to the informal English descriptions that typically 
pass as language standards. In the context of formal methods, 
such as static analysis, model checking, and program proving, 
formal semantics are required to validate the abstract 
interpretations and program logic (e.g., axiomatic semantics) 
used to analyze and verify programs. Formal semantics for 
the involved languages are also a prerequisite for verifying 
programming tools, such as compilers, type checkers, static 
analyzers, and program verifiers. In other computer science 
fields, several studies have focused on developing 
mechanized formalizations of operational semantics for 
different high-level programming languages. For example, the 
Cholera project [20] formalized the static and dynamic 
semantics of a large subset of the C language using the HOL 
proof assistant. The CompCert project [21] has conducted 
influential verification work for C and GCC, and a formal 
semantics denoted as Clight was developed for a subset of C. 
This formed the basis for VST [22] and CompCertX [23]. In 
addition, several interesting formal verification studies have 
been conducted for operating systems based on the CompCert 
project. Tews et al. [24] developed denotational semantics for 
a subset of the C++ language that were presented as shallow 
embedding in the PVS prover. Igarashi et al. [25] presented a 
minimal core calculus for Java and Generic Java, and verified 
the important core properties. A similar study was conducted 
to prove Java type soundness [26]. In addition, the 
operational semantics of JavaScript have been investigated 
[27], which is of particular interest in the present work 
because Solidity is similar to JavaScript. However, most of 
these studies focused on specific domains and programming 
languages, and cannot be readily extended for the verification 
of blockchain smart contracts. 
This paper addresses the above issues by developing a 
formal symbolic process virtual machine (FSPVM) denoted 
as FSPVM-E for verifying the reliability and security of 
Ethereum-based services at the source code level of smart 
contracts. The work of this paper was primarily inspired by 
the symbolic process virtual machine KLEE [28], which is a 
well-known and successful certification tool based on 
symbolic execution. The proposed FSPVM-E is formulated 
in Coq because it is one of the most highly regarded and 
widely employed proof assistants [29]. The present study 
capitalizes on our progress over the past year for developing a 
powerful hybrid FSPVM system in Coq to verify smart 
contract properties on multiple blockchain platforms [11], 
[30], [31], [32], [33]. The proposed system combines the 
advantages of virtual machine platforms, static vulnerability 
scanning, higher-order logic theorem proving, and symbolic 
execution technology based on an extension of Curry-Howard 
isomorphism (CHI) [34], denoted as execution-verification 
isomorphism (EVI) [11], and avoids their respective 
disadvantages, to symbolically execute real-world programs 
and automatically verify the smart contracts of Ethereum-
based services. The present report systematically illustrates 
the FSPVM-E architecture, elaborates on the novel features 
of each component, presents experimental results, and 
introduces real world application examples. Specifically, the 
present work makes the following contributions. 
 Formal memory model: We design and implement 
a general, extensible, and reusable formal memory 
framework denoted as the GERM framework to 
virtualize the real-world memory hardware, basic 
memory operations, and pointer arithmetic in Coq. 
 Formal specification language for Solidity: We 
formalize and mechanize an extensible and 
universal large subset of the Solidity programming 
language in Coq with generalized algebraic 
datatypes (GADTs) [35]. This represents a formal 
intermediate programming language denoted as 
Lolisa. The supported subset of Solidity is 
comparable to the subsets commonly recommended 
for writing common Ethereum-based smart 
contracts, and includes the built-in functions of the 
EVM. It also solves the consistency problem 
associated with existing higher-order logic theorem 
proving technologies. 
 Execution and proof engine: An optimized formal 
verified interpreter is developed in Coq for Lolisa, 
denoted as FEther, which connects the GERM 
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framework and Lolisa, and serves as an execution 
engine to symbolically execute and verify the smart 
contracts of Ethereum written in Lolisa within Coq 
with high level evaluation efficiency [33]. 
 Assistant tools and libraries: We provide assistant 
tools and libraries, including a specification 
generator, a language translator, a static analysis 
library, and an automatic tactic library, which are 
respectively applied to generate dynamic 
specifications, translate Solidity into Lolisa, store 
the specifications of standard smart contract 
vulnerabilities, and provide an automatic evaluation 
strategy. These tools and libraries significantly 
improve the degree of automation and the 
validation efficiency of FSPVM-E. 
The above core components of FSPVM-E are applied to 
virtualize Coq as an extensible and general-purpose toolchain 
for Ethereum smart contract verification, which reduces the 
verification workload and learning threshold. In addition, 
FSPVM-E has the following novel features. 
 Executable and Provable: Defining FSPVM-E 
based on the GERM framework allows, 
theoretically, for formal smart contracts to be 
symbolically executed, and their properties 
simultaneously and automatically verified using 
higher-order logic theorem-proving assistants, 
which, when conducted in conjunction with a 
formal interpreter, is comparable to the execution 
of real-world programs. 
 Extensible and Universal: Although FSPVM-E is 
designed specifically for the Ethereum platform, 
each component includes many general features 
applicable to other blockchain platforms. Thus, the 
core functions can be extended to formalize similar 
programming languages. 
 Trusted and Certified: The self-correctness of 
FSPVM-E core components is verified in Coq 
completely, and the correctness of assistant tools 
not programmed in Coq is also guaranteed. 
 Hybrid verification system: In conjunction with 
Lolisa and the static analysis library, FSPVM-E 
supports basic static analysis to automatically scan 
standard vulnerabilities hidden in source code. In 
addition, FEther supports multiple types of 
symbolic execution for verification using FSPVM-
E. Finally, FSPVM-E provides a debugging 
mechanism for general programmers to identify the 
vulnerabilities of source code. In this manner, users 
of FSPVM-E can flexibly select the most suitable 
method for analyzing and verifying their programs. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. 
Section II briefly presents the essential concepts of 
FSPVM-E. Section III describes the overall FSPVM-E 
architecture. Section IV discusses the methods by which the 
self-correctness of FSPVM-E is ensured, and also defines 
the non-aftereffect property to guarantee the correctness of 
assistant tools that are not programmed in Coq. Section V 
presents simple case studies to illustrate the advantages and 
novel features of FSPVM-E for verifying the security and 
reliability of smart contracts. Section VI discusses the 
extensibility and universality of FSPVM-E, and provides a 
preliminary scheme for systematically extending FSPVM-E 
to support different blockchain platforms. Section VII 
provides a comparison of FSPVM-E with related work for 
the formal verification for Ethereum smart contracts. Finally, 
Section VIII presents conclusions and future directions of 
research. 
II. FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS 
Prior to defining the formal specifications of FSPVM-E, it 
is necessary first to define the fundamental environment 
FSPVM-E. 
TABLE 3 
STATE FUNCTIONS OF FSPVM-E 
𝛭 Memory space ℰ Environment information 
𝛬 Memory address set 𝛺 Native value set 
𝒱 Verified logic term ℱ Overall formal system 
𝛤 Proof context 𝒞 Code segments 
Table 3 lists the state functions used to calculate 
commonly needed values from the current state of the 
program. All of these state functions will be encountered in 
the following discussion. Components of specific states will 
be denoted using the appropriate Greek letter subscripted 
by the state of interest. As shown in Table 3, the proof 
context [29, 36] (denoted as 𝛤, 𝛤1, etc.) refers to the proof 
environment or local proof theory which contains proved 
local propositions as additional information, and decorate 
assumptions by discharge rules that are applied when 
leaving a context, and the 𝛤𝑐 is adoped as the current logic 
context. In the following contents, we will use context to 
represent proof context. The formal memory space in the 
context is denoted as M , and σ  represents specific 
memory states. The context of the execution environment is 
represented as ℰ, and the env and fenv are adopted as the 
current environment that stores the current execution 
environment information, and the super-environment that 
which stores the super environment information before the 
execution environment transformation. The symbol ⊳ 
represents the abstract binary relationship that left logic 
definition could be unfolded as the right logic expression to 
get more information in the proof context. This meaning of 
the symbol will be specified in different specific rules. We 
assign Λ to denote a set of memory addresses, and we 
adopt 𝒱 to represent the verified logic terms in the proof 
assistant.  
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Fig.1. Architecture of the FSPVM-E verification system. 
 
Fig.2. General workflow of the FSPVM-E. 
Furthermore, we assign Ω as the native value set of the 
basic logic system. For brevity in the following discussion, 
we will assign ℱ to represent the overall formal system. 
The operational semantics of Lolisa is abbreviated as 𝑆, 
and the evaluation process is denoted as ⇓. In addition, to 
avoid ambiguity in the following discussion, we employ the 
term 𝒫𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚 to represent a generic program written in a 
functional specification language, such as Coq, the term 
programrw  represents a generic program written in a 
general-purpose programming language ℒ , and 
programformal  represents the formal version of 
programrw  written using the formalized version of ℒ , 
denoted as ℱℒ. 
III. FSPVM-E ARCHITECTURE AND IMPLEMENTATION 
The kernel of the FSPVM-E framework was developed 
entirely in Coq, and Coq was employed as the trusted 
computation base (TCB) [37]. Here, Coq served not only as 
a prover for conducting semantic preservation proofs, but 
also as a programming language for programming all 
verified components of the FSPVM-E framework. The 
specification language of Coq includes a small, purely 
functional language denoted as Gallina, which features 
recursive functions that operate by pattern matching over 
inductive types (i.e., ML- or Haskell-style tree-shaped data 
types). With some ingenuity, Gallina is sufficiently 
sophisticated for programming a process virtual machine. 
However, the highly imperative algorithms found in 
programming language and interpreter textbooks must 
rewrite in a purely functional style. 
The overall architecture of FSPVM-E is illustrated in 
Fig.1, where a dashed arrow (⇢) represents a logical 
dependency relation, and a solid arrow (⟶) represents data 
transmission. Here, FSPVM-E is designed according to Von 
Neuman architecture, and it is logically constructed based 
on two sectors: a foundational sector and an extensible 
sector. In the foundational sector, the higher-order logic 
proof environment of Coq is virtualized as the FSPVM-E 
execution environment, which serves as the logic operating 
environment, and the trusted core of Coq (TCOC) is 
virtualized as a central processing unit, and takes Gallina as 
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the logic machine-level language. 
The extensible sector consists of four components. The 
first component is the GERM framework. The second 
component is Lolisa. The third component is FEther. The 
final component is the set of assistant tools and libraries, 
including translator and generator that are developed in 
untrusted domain using C++. The fundamental component 
is the formal memory model GERM. It serves as logic 
memory states to support operational semantics 
formalization and record all intermediate states during 
symbolic execution and verification. Based on this formal 
memory model, the second component, a formal 
intermediate specification language Lolisa, is able to be 
defined. It formalizes the selected abstract syntax and 
corresponding semantics of Solidity language into Coq. 
Finally, based on the GERM and Lolisa, we can construct 
the third component that is a formal interpreter FEther. It is 
used to symbolically execute the formal programs model 
written in Lolisa.  
The general workflow is shown in Fig.2. First of all, 
FEther will take the initial memory state and formal 
programs as parameters. Next, the FEther will parse the 
formal programs according to the syntax of Lolisa. Finally, 
FEther will invoke the formal operational semantics and 
interact with GERM to generate a new formal memory state. 
These components in the current version of FSPVM-E 
include about 16,000 lines of Coq source code and 4,000 
lines of C++ source code. The specific workload for 
constructing the FSPVM-E framework is itemized in the 
Table 4. In this manner, FSPVM-E simulates the process of 
program execution in the real world, in that a program 
written in a high-level programming language is interpreted 
into machine code and executed on the hardware of the 
operating environment in Coq. The details of these four 
components are respectively discussed in Subsections III.A 
to III.D. 
TABLE 4 
WORKLOAD STATISTICS FOR CONSTRUCTING THE FSPVM-E FRAMEWORK 
Classification 
Lines in 
Coq 
Lines in 
C++ 
Formal memory model (GERM) 3,849 0 
Specification language (Lolisa) 1,004 0 
Executable interpreter (FEther) 7,726 0 
Automatic tactic library 427 0 
Self-correctness library 1,883 0 
Static analysis library 1,053 0 
Generator 0 1,476 
Translator 0 2,743 
A. GENERAL FORMAL MEMORY MODEL 
The GERM framework simulates physical memory 
hardware structure, including a low-level formal memory 
space, and provides a set of simple, nonintrusive application 
programming interfaces using Coq that can support 
different formal verification specifications simultaneously, 
particularly at the code level. In theory, it is well suited as a 
basis for arbitrary high-level specifications in different 
formal models for program verification. 
The overall GERM framework structure is illustrated in 
Fig.3. The first component of the formal memory model is 
the formal memory space, which is modeled as a collection 
of disjoint blocks, and we adopt persistent data structures 
that support efficient updates without modifying data 
inplace. Likewise, a monadic programming style enables us 
to encode exceptions and states in a legible, compositional 
manner. According to the figure, the GERM framework is 
based on the TCOC, and can be used as a basis for high-
level formal specifications. 
 
Fig.3. Architecture of the GERM memory model.  
The data structure of the formal memory space is 
illustrated by the example given in Fig.4, where each 
memory record field specifies a logic memory block with 
type value. Users can define specific memory sizes 
according to their requirements with the help of assistant 
tools, which are introduced in Subsection III.D. The details 
regarding the formal memory space of the GERM 
framework are presented as follows. 
According to the definition of record datatype given by 
Coq’s reference manual [29], each field block 𝑏 𝑑 in Coq 
has a unique corresponding field name  𝑑, and the data 
stored in the 𝑏 𝑑 block of a specific record value 𝑟𝑣 can 
be directly accessed by its corresponding  𝑑. In memory, 
𝑏 𝑑  represents the logic memory block, and the 
corresponding  𝑑 is formalized as the memory absolute 
address 𝑀 𝑑𝑑𝑟   . In this manner, the GERM framework 
statically guarantees that each memory block has a unique 
𝑀 𝑑𝑑𝑟    at the type level. Additionally, in contrast to 
relevant data structures based on a tree or graph structure 
[38], which must search all nodes individually to modify a 
memory block, the GERM framework can access and 
modify the block directly through its corresponding 
𝑀 𝑑𝑑𝑟   . 
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Record memory: Type: = new { 
m_0xinit: value 
m_0x00000000: value 
m_0x00000001: value 
m_0x00000002: value 
m_0x00000003: value 
… 
m_0x0000000F: value 
}  
Fig.4. Formal memory space, including the formal specification of 
memory space in Coq (left), and the real-world physical memory space 
structure (right). 
To improve the flexibility of memory operations, the 
GERM framework in its current form also provides a label 
memory address level. In detail, this level first provides a 
special identifier denoted as a label address 𝐿 𝑑𝑑𝑟   , which 
is a metavariable defined as an enumeration type in Coq as 
follows. 
𝐿 𝑑𝑑𝑟   ∶∶ = _0x00000000 | […] | _0xFFFFFFFF | 𝛬 𝑝 𝑐     
Special address: 𝛬 𝑝 𝑐   ∶∶ = _0xinit | _0xsend | _0xsend_re | 
_0xcall | _0xmsg | _0xaddress | _0xblock  
Here, 𝛬 𝑝 𝑐    is used as the reference for data 
structures and functions in the EVM standard library. 
Accordingly, programmers can define custom mapping 
strategies 𝑀𝑎   𝑐  to map 𝐿 𝑑𝑑𝑟    to 𝑀 𝑑𝑑𝑟    as 
follows. 
𝑀𝑎 (𝐿 𝑑𝑑𝑟   ) =  
𝑚𝑎    𝑀𝑎   𝑐(𝐿 𝑑𝑑𝑟   )𝑤     
| 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 → 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟  
| 𝑂𝐾(𝑀 𝑑𝑑𝑟   ) → 𝑀 𝑑𝑑𝑟     
  𝑑.   
Here, if the return value is 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 , the mapping is 
deemed to have failed, and the mapping is successful if the 
return value is 𝑂𝐾(𝑀 𝑑𝑑𝑟   ). Similarly, 𝐿 𝑑𝑑𝑟    can be 
employed in the GERM framework to accurately model 
pointer arithmetic. Briefly, users can define pointer objects 
in high-level specifications, apply 𝑀𝑎 (𝐿 𝑑𝑑𝑟   )  to 
reference a location in memory, and obtain the logic 
expressions stored at that location. The pointer arithmetic 
mechanism defined in Lolisa based on 𝐿 𝑑𝑑𝑟    is briefly 
introduced in Subsection III.B. Moreover, the label address 
level reserves the extension space for simulating virtual 
memory and memory isolation mechanisms, such as a 
memory management unit and a TrustZone. 
A benefit of designing FSPVM-E according to von 
Neumann architecture is that the GERM framework 
memory space is able to store the program instructions and 
data values simultaneously and thereby accurately simulate 
a real-world memory space and guarantee the reliability of 
the formal memory model. Hence, the memory value type 
 𝑎    is inductively defined as rule 1. 
 𝑎   ∶∶ = 𝑏 𝑜  𝑣 →     →    → 𝑓   → 𝑜     →
𝑎   →  𝑎     (1) 
In conjunction with logic memory value 𝑏 𝑜  𝑣, as shown 
in rule 1, the corresponding block size, the current and 
super logic execution environment information     and 
𝑓   , respectively, block allocation flag 𝑜     , and 
modification authority 𝑎   . Currently, 𝑏 𝑜  𝑣  supports 
14 datatypes, including basic arithmetic data values (undef, 
integer, float, Boolean, string, byte, structure, array, and 
mapping), program instructions (statement), and pointer 
objects (variable pointer, parameter pointer, function 
pointer, and contract pointer). One of the benefits of the 
type constructor of  𝑎    is that the safety of memory 
specifications can be readily ensured in the GERM 
framework. For example, a 𝑏 𝑜  𝑣  corresponding to an 
uninitialized memory block will be initialized as 
𝑈 𝑑 𝑓(  ) rather than as a random value. Similarly, all 
information regarding the current memory state is explicitly 
stored by the corresponding typing constructors. In this 
manner, in 𝛤𝑐 , the env and fenv record the execution 
environment information, and the block information 
indexed by an address can be accessed from current 
memory state. As abstracted in rule 2, a memory operation 
𝑜 𝑐ℎ 𝑐𝑘 can modify a specific block by taking current states, 
address, env and fenv as parameters, and generated a new 
optional memory state, where ⊳  represents the binary 
relation that for an arbitrary memory address 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟 can 
access a defined logic memory block from the memory state 
𝑚      of 𝛤𝑐, and ↪ is represented the evaluation process 
of 𝑜 𝑐ℎ 𝑐𝑘. 
 ℰ ⊢   𝑣    ℰ ⊢    𝑣
𝛤𝑐(𝑚𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒. 𝑑𝑑𝑟)⊳(𝑏 𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑣,   𝑜𝑟1,…,   𝑜𝑟𝑛)     
𝑜𝑝𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑐𝑘(𝑚𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒. 𝑑𝑑𝑟,  𝑣,   𝑣)↪⟦𝑚𝑣⟧
              (2) 
As such, conventional memory safety problems, such as 
buffer overflows and dangling pointers, can be readily 
exposed in the GERM framework by symbolic execution. 
Although the current version of the GERM framework is 
adjusted to support FSPVM-E, users can extend the  𝑎    
specifications because the GERM framework can function 
independently with other formal models. Here, as the 
abstraction of the  𝑎    definition defined in rule 3 
programmers can add new specifications   𝑓𝑜𝑟  into the 
 𝑎    constructor to represent and store new logic 
information according to the specific requirements of 
different projects and situations. 
 𝑎   : 𝑏 𝑜  𝑣 →   𝑓𝑜𝑟0 →   𝑓𝑜𝑟1 → [… ]  
→   𝑓𝑜𝑟 →  𝑎   ,  (3) 
Finally, we provide 9 classes of basic operations in the 
GERM framework, which include map, initialize, read, 
write, address offset, search, allocate, and free. Any higher-
order specifications can take the GERM framework as their 
fundamental logic state, and apply memory operation APIs 
to formalize memory-based or memory-related higher level 
specifications in Coq, such as formal semantics and 
operating systems. 
B. LOLISA 
m_0x00000000 value
m_0x00000001 value
m_0x00000002 value
m_0x00000003 value
… …
m_0x0000000F value
Memory Address Data Value
m_0xinit value
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Following the process illustrated in Fig.5, most of the 
syntax and respective semantics of Lolisa are formalized 
strictly following the official Ethereum documentation of 
Solidity version 0.4. Due to limitation of length, the details 
of Lolisa’s formalization have been presented in our online 
report (https://arxiv.org/abs/1803.09885). 
 
 
Fig.5. Relationships between Solidity and Lolisa.  
The specific syntax and semantics of Lolisa are 
separated as four layers, from bottom to top, including types, 
values, expressions and statements. All reference data 
structures can be formalized in Lolisa because each variable 
identifier   𝑑 is allocated a memory address based on the 
GERM framework, and can be abstracted as an 𝜆 -
application form according to the rule 4 where 𝑥 is a 𝜆-
bounded parameter and 𝑎 is a label address. 
  𝑑 ≔ (𝜆 (𝑥: 𝐿 𝑑𝑑𝑟   ). 𝑥)(𝑎: 𝐿 𝑑𝑑𝑟   )  (4) 
As such, the syntax of Lolisa not only includes nearly all the 
characteristic components of Solidity, such as array, 
mapping, message, send, transfer, address, modifier, 
contract, and gas types, but it also contains general-purpose 
programming language features, such as multiple return 
values, pointer arithmetic, struct, field access, module, and 
the full power of functions, including recursive functions 
and function pointers. These abstract syntax components 
are defined as an inductive type statement, and connected 
by a list type. However, there are still some challenges in 
current version of Lolisa. The first challenge is inline 
assembly. The formalization of inline assembly needs 
accurate formal models of hardware such as registers that 
has not been supported in current FSPVM-E. Besides, 
according to our experimental results, the precision of 
formal floating-point datatype will be lost during unit 
conversion. Therefore, inline assembly and the explicit 
ether unit of Solidity are omitted in Lolisa which are the 
limitations of current version Lolisa. Currently, if a code 
segment includes inline assembly and explicit ether unit, 
the code needs to be rebuilt manually. We have planned to 
overcome these two challenges in our future work. In 
addition, to guarantee structural verification, the goto 
statement, and non-structured forms of switching such as 
Duff’s device [39] are not supported in Lolisa. In this 
manner, the Solidity can be translated into Lolisa 
consistently. As explained above, due to limitation of length, 
the details about formalizations and properties have been 
presented in our online report [11]. 
In particular, different from other FSLs of Solidity, such 
as K framework based Solidity semantics 
(https://github.com/kframework/solidity-semantics) the 
formal syntax of Lolisa [11] is defined using generalized 
algebraic datatypes (GADTs). As indicated by the rule 5, a 
syntax token T is specified by static type annotations 𝜏  for 
all values and expressions of Lolisa. 
𝑇 ∷ 𝜏0 → [… ] →  𝜏 → 𝑇   ,  (5) 
This ensures that the formal syntax of values and 
expressions is more clear and abstract, and facilitates the 
strict maintenance of type safety for Lolisa expressions. In 
addition, employing a combination of type annotations 
facilitates the definition of a very large number of different 
expressions based on equivalent constructors. The 
application scope of different statements is limited by 
different combinations of 𝜏   and 𝜏𝑜𝑢 . For example, in 
the specification of If statement defined in rule 6, the input 
type 𝜏   of the condition expression has no limitation, but 
the return type 𝜏𝑜𝑢  of the condition expression must be 
Boolean type 𝑇𝑏𝑜𝑜 . Different from If statement, in the 
specification of Assign statement defined in rule 7, the input 
type 𝜏 and 𝜏0 of the left and right expressions have no 
limitation, but the 𝜏𝑜𝑢  of the left and right expressions 
must be equivalent 𝜏1. 
𝐼𝑓: ∀ (𝜏:     ),  𝑥 𝑟𝜏 𝑇𝑏𝑜𝑜 →   𝑎  𝑚   →   𝑎  𝑚   →
  𝑎  𝑚   ,  (6) 
𝐴   𝑔 : ∀ (𝜏 𝜏0 𝜏1:     ),  𝑥 𝑟𝜏 𝜏1 →  𝑥 𝑟𝜏0 𝜏1 →
  𝑎  𝑚   ,  (7) 
However, the application of GADTs provides Lolisa with a 
stronger static type system than Solidity because the type 
system of Lolisa strictly defines the syntax rules and 
relevant limitations in the formal specifications as typing 
judgments. For example, in the If statement defined in rule 
6, its condition expression is limited by type  𝑥 𝑟𝜏 𝑇𝑏𝑜𝑜 , 
which specifies that the normal form of a specific condition 
must be a Boolean type. As such, an ill-typed If statement, 
such as 
∀    ′:   𝑎  𝑚   , (𝐼𝑓 (𝐸 𝑜   (𝑉  𝑑 𝑓(  )))     ′) , 
would be disclosed by the type-checking mechanism of Coq, 
which would then present the error message shown in Fig.6. 
An additional benefit to the use of GADTs in Lolisa is that 
the resulting strong static type-checking system assists in 
discovering errors imported when translating Solidity into 
Lolisa. This is particularly beneficial because, although 
syntax errors would be discovered during compilation in the 
EVM, implementing a compiler mechanism in Coq to check 
for syntactical correctness when translating Solidity into 
Lolisa would be an extremely challenging task. Moreover, 
such errors can seriously affect the evaluation of programs 
in higher-order theorem-proving assistants.  
GADTs Typing 
Judgement
Inductive Operational 
Semantics
Solidity Syntax Formal 
Specifications
Syntactic Sugar Layer
Solidity Syntax Solidity Semantics
Executable Operational 
Semantics
Trusted Domain in Coq
equivalent abstract
equivalent equivalent
map
map Formal Smart 
Contracts
Smart Contracts
translate
yields
yields
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Fig.6. Simple example of an error message generated by the type-checking mechanism of Coq in response to the ill-typed If statement 
∀ 𝐬 𝐬′: 𝐬𝐭𝐚𝐭𝐞𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭, (𝐈𝐟 (𝐄𝐜𝐨𝐧𝐬𝐭(𝐕𝐮𝐧𝐝𝐞𝐟(𝐭𝐭)))  𝐬 𝐬′) in Lolisa. 
In addition, because Solidity can be translated into Lolisa 
line-by-line, the strong static type-checking system also 
assists in discovering ill-typed terms in Solidity source code. 
To our knowledge, Lolisa is the first formal specification 
language of Solidity using GADTs. 
The semantics of Lolisa are formally defined as big-step 
operational semantics with two forms: inductive relational 
forms and executable function forms. The operational 
semantics of Lolisa defined as the relational form are 
unified with symbol 𝑆𝑟  , and the executable operational 
semantics are represented as symbol 𝑆 𝑥 . 𝑆𝑟   is applied 
to verify properties of Solidity, and 𝑆 𝑥  is developed as 
the kernel of symbolic execution engine that can be invoked 
by FEther. Because Lolisa is employed as a formal 
intermediate language for Solidity, which should be able to 
be parsed, executed, and verified in Coq or a similar proof 
assistant, the semantics of Lolisa are deterministic, and are 
also based on the GERM framework. The equivalence 
between the inductive relational forms 𝑆𝑟   and the 
executable function forms 𝑆 𝑥  of the operational 
semantics of Lolisa is certified by the following simulation 
diagram theorem, where the n represents the step limitation 
which will be explained in the next section.  
Theorem (simulation diagram): Let 
ℰ,𝛭, ℱ ⊢    𝜎, 𝑜 𝑎𝑟 ,    , 𝑓   , 𝑏   𝑜𝑟  be the initial 
evaluation environment, and let 𝑅 𝑞  represent an 
equivalence relationship between any two terms. Then, any 
relational semantic 𝑆𝑟   and executable semantic 𝑆 𝑥  
must satisfy the simulation diagram (Fig.7). 
 
Fig.7. Diagram for the correctness certification of Lolisa semantics.  
In addition, the development of FEther in Coq and its 
verification process will be simplified if a  𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚 𝑜𝑟𝑚   
written in Lolisa is maintained as a structural program. To 
ensure this condition, the semantics of Lolisa are made to 
adhere to the following program counter axiom. 
Axiom (Program Counter): Suppose that, for all 
statements s, if s is the next execution statement, it must be 
the head of the statement sequence in the next execution 
iteration. 
It must also be noted that the formal syntax of Lolisa 
contains numerous typing limitations, and is overly complex 
to accommodate its adoption by general users, as illustrated 
by the example If statement given in Fig.8a and 8b. 
Therefore, Lolisa is made more intuitive by encapsulating 
the abstract syntax tree of Lolisa into symbol abbreviations 
based on the macro-mechanism of Coq, which is denoted as 
the notation mechanism. A notation is a symbolic 
abbreviation denoting some term or term pattern, which can 
be parsed by Coq automatically. For example, the notation 
shown in Fig.8c can be employed to encapsulate the If 
statement given in Fig.8b, with the result shown in Fig.8d. 
The use of the notation mechanism in Lolisa is illustrated 
by the components enclosed within the dashed-line box in 
Fig.5. As a result, the fixed formal syntax components of 
Lolisa used in verification are transparent to users, and 
thereby provide users with a simpler syntax. Moreover, this 
mechanism makes the consistency between real-world 
languages and Lolisa far more intuitive and user friendly. 
An additional benefit of this mechanism is that it provides 
for improved automation of the formalization process. Here, 
as was conducted when converting Fig.8b to Fig.8d, the 
syntactic sugar is the interface to connect the translator. The 
translator is constructed by three modules: lexical analysis 
module, syntax analysis module and program specification 
generation module. The lexical analysis module consists of 
two components: pattern matching sub-module and 
behavior matching sub-module. The kernel of this module is 
Flex lexical analysis generator that uses regular expression 
mechanism to form morphemes of characters in source 
programs. The syntax analysis module is used to generate 
the abstract syntax tree based on left-child right-sibling 
binary tree algorithm. Finally, the program specification 
generation module converts the abstract syntax tree from 
C++ into the corresponding syntax sugar notations of Lolisa. 
In addition, these macro-definitions are helpful for 
promoting extensibility to other programming languages, 
the details of which are discussed in Section VI. 
𝑆𝑟  
𝑆 𝑥 
𝑟     
𝑟      
𝑆 𝑥  , 𝜎, 𝑜 𝑎𝑟 ,    , 𝑓   , 𝑏   𝑜𝑟
ℰ,𝛭, ℱ ⊢   𝜎, 𝑜 𝑎𝑟 ,    , 𝑓   , 𝑏   𝑜𝑟
𝜎,    , 𝑓   , 𝑏   𝑜𝑟, 𝑜 𝑎𝑟 , ⇓  𝑒 
ℰ,𝛭, ℱ ⊢   𝜎, 𝑜 𝑎𝑟 ,    , 𝑓   , 𝑏   𝑜𝑟
𝑅 𝑞 𝑅 𝑞
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Fig.8. Example of macro definitions of the Lolisa formal abstract syntax tree. 
 
Fig.9. Architecture of FEther. 
Finally, we have developed a small standard library in 
Coq that incorporates the built-in data structures and 
functions of the EVM to facilitate the execution and 
verification of Solidity programs rewritten in Lolisa using 
higher-order logic theorem-proving assistants directly. 
Currently, this standard library is a small subset that 
includes the syntax components msg, address, block, send, 
call, and requires. Lolisa is the first mechanized and 
validated formal syntax and semantics developed for 
Solidity. The consistency relationship between Solidity and 
Lolisa is defined according to the following rule 8, where   
is the statement of Solidity and 𝒯 reprents the translation 
process from Solidity into Lolisa. 
∀  ,  ∈ 𝑆𝑜  𝑑   ∧ 𝒯( ) ∈ 𝐿𝑜   𝑎 ⊢  ≡ 𝒯( ) (8) 
C. FETHER 
FEther is an extensible definitional interpreter that is 
completely developed in Coq based on the GERM 
framework and Lolisa. The overall FEther structure is 
illustrated in Fig.9. FEther is entirely constructed in the 
TCOC, and logically comprises three main components 
from left to right: a parser, an instruction set architecture 
(ISA) based on Lolisa semantics, and a validation checking 
mechanism. 
The parser is employed to analyze the syntax of a 
 𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚 𝑜𝑟𝑚   written in Lolisa, extract the tokens from 
 𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚 𝑜𝑟𝑚  , and invoke corresponding semantics. As 
mentioned above, Lolisa types are used as the type 
signatures in Lolisa value and expression layers, and are 
dependent on corresponding Lolisa values. Therefore, the 
parsing and execution processes of types and values are 
combined together. 
Statement Abstract 
Syntax Parser
Expression Abstract 
Syntax Parser
Type and Value Abstract
Syntax Parser
Parser
Formal Statement 
Semantics
Formal Expression 
Semantics
Formal Type and 
Value Semantics
Formal ISA
parse
parse
Formal Smart Contracts
execute
token
token, 𝑚𝑣  𝑢 0
𝑚𝑣  𝑢 1
token, 𝑚𝑣  𝑢 1
𝑚𝑣  𝑢 0
𝑚     
′
𝑚𝑣  𝑢 0
𝑚𝑣  𝑢 1
Formal Interpreter
Trusted Domain of Coq
𝑚     preconditions verify
Gas Checking
Memory State
Validating
Value Validating
Validation
fenv, env, gas
𝑚𝑣  𝑢 ,𝑚     
′
Formal Memory 
Model
Trusted Core
of Coq
𝑚     
′
require
invoke
𝑚     
require, invoke
𝑚𝑣  𝑢 
𝑚     
′
Property
Theorems
                                                       Z. Yang, et al: Preparation of Papers for IEEE Access (December 2019) 
 
11  
ℰ⊢  𝑣,   𝑣           𝛭⊢𝜎,𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜             ℱ ⊢ 𝑜𝑝 𝑟            ℰ,𝛭,ℱ ⊢ 𝑃(   )         ℰ,𝛭,ℱ ⊢   𝑏
  𝑣=   𝑔𝑎𝑠(    𝑒𝑛𝑣(𝑃(   )))              𝑣=    𝑒𝑛𝑣(𝑃(   ))
𝜎=    𝑚𝑒𝑚(𝑃(   ),  𝑏)
ℰ,𝛭,ℱ ⊢ 𝐹𝐸 ℎ 𝑟(⟦𝑚𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒
′ ⟧,  𝑣′,   𝑣, 𝑟𝑔 ,𝑃(   )) 
𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑒,𝑇
⇒        〈𝜎′,  𝑣,   𝑣〉
                                          (9) 
ℰ⊢  𝑣,   𝑣         𝛭⊢𝜎,𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜           ℱ ⊢ 𝑜𝑝 𝑟          ℰ,𝛭,ℱ ⊢ 𝑃(   )        ℰ,𝛭,ℱ ⊢   𝑏
  𝑣=   𝑔𝑎𝑠(    𝑒𝑛𝑣(𝑃(   )))            𝑣=    𝑒𝑛𝑣(𝑃(   ))
𝜎=    𝑚𝑒𝑚(𝑃(   ),  𝑏)
ℰ,𝛭,ℱ ⊢ 𝐹𝐸 ℎ 𝑟(⟦𝑚𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒
′ ⟧,  𝑣′,   𝑣, 𝑟𝑔 ,𝑃(   )) 
𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑒,∞
⇒         〈𝜎′,  𝑣′,   𝑣〉 ∨   𝑣′.(𝑔  )→(¬   𝑣.(𝑔  𝐿 𝑚  )) 
 𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑒,𝑇
⇒         〈𝜎′,  𝑣′,   𝑣〉
 (10) 
 
Because FEther is a very large function written in the 
Gallina specification language, FEther differs from the 
kernel of other real-world virtual machines of high-level 
programming languages, such as Smalltalk, Java, and Net, 
which support bytecode as their ISA, and are implemented 
by translating the bytecode for commonly used code paths 
into native machine code. In our work, FEther takes the 
executable semantics of Lolisa as the ISA, which is 
employed to specify the semantics of the syntax tokens to 
represent their execution behaviors accurately. Currently, 
FEther fully supports all semantics of Lolisa. 
The validation checking mechanism includes both 
checking the validation of the results (including memory 
states and memory values) and checking the execution 
condition. Because all functions are vulnerable to undefined 
conditions due to various causes, we develop functions with 
the help of a monad [40]. Here, all functions are tagged by 
an option type. If a function generates a valid result, the 
result will be returned in the form of Some t. Otherwise, it 
will be returned as an undefined value None. In addition, 
the symbol ⟦ ⟧ represents a term t tagged by the option 
type. 
To avoid the execution of infinite loops in programs, 
FSPVM-E also adopts a K-step limitation mechanism, 
where, similar to Bounded Model Checking (BMC) [41], 
we limit FEther to executing a  𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚 𝑜𝑟𝑚   K times at 
most. This gas mechanism design well suits the BMC 
approach. Therefore, our implementation uses gas to limit 
the execution of Lolisa programs in FEther. To be specific, 
The semantics governing the execution of a Lolisa program 
 𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚 𝑜𝑟𝑚   (abbreviated as 𝑃(   )) are defined by 
the rule 9 and 10, where ∞ refers to infinite execution and 
T represents the set of termination conditions for finite 
execution. These rules represent two conditions of 𝑃(   ) 
execution. Under the first condition governed by the rule 9, 
𝑃(   ) terminates once a finite number of steps owing to 
some reasons, such as exception or natural termination. And 
the 𝐹𝐸   𝑟(⟦𝑚     
′ ⟧,    ′, 𝑓   , 𝑎𝑟𝑔 , 𝑃(   ))  represents 
the specific enter point of the whole FEther interpreter. 
Under the second condition governed by the rule 10, 
𝑃(   ) cannot terminate via its internal logic and would 
undergo an infinite number of steps. Therefore, 𝑃(   ) is 
deliberately stopped via the gas limitation checking 
mechanism that the execution will be terminated after the 
gas balance is reduced to zero. Here, 𝑜 𝑎𝑟  represents a 
list of optional arguments. In addition, the initial 
environment     and super-environment 𝑓    are 
equivalent, except for their gas values, which are initialized 
by the helper function       𝑣, and the initial gas value of 
    is set by    𝑔  . Finally, the initial memory state is set 
by     𝑚 𝑚, considering 𝑃(   ) and the standard library 
  𝑏 as arguments.  
In addition, according to the construction of Lolisa 
mentioned previously, FEther is also separated as four 
levels, and it benefits from Lolisa by achieving low 
coupling between the executable semantics at same layers 
and at different layers. Specifically, the executable 
semantics at same levels are independent of each other, and 
are encapsulated as modules with a set of interfaces. At 
different layers, higher-layers’ semantics can only access 
lower-layers’ semantics via interfaces, and the 
implementation details of lower-layer semantics are 
transparent to higher-layer semantics, which is represented 
by the dashed-line box in Fig.5. The implementation of 
higher-layer semantics is also not dependent on the details 
of lower-layer semantics. In this manner, FEther can be 
extended, as is discussed in Section VI. 
D.ASSISTANT TOOLS AND LIBRARIES 
The assistant tools and automation-assisting libraries of 
FSPVM-E are used to reduce the manual workload and 
increase the degree of automation when users deploy 
FSPVM-E, formalize target smart contracts, and verify 
properties. 
 
Assistant Tools. As discussed previously, FSPVM-E 
includes customizable components for implementing the 
specific requirements of users, such as memory space and 
label addresses, that must be defined dynamically. Taking 
the memory space given in Fig.4 as an example, the size of 
the specific formal memory space depends on the size that 
users require. The enumeration of memory blocks is 
conducted manually as rule 11. 
memory ≡ Record⟨maddr
∗, mvalue
∗⟩  (11) 
Clearly, defining a specific memory space by 
enumerating blocks manually would be very tedious work. 
Fortunately, all dynamic specifications like rule 11 above 
have fixed abstract models. Therefore, these dynamic 
specifications can be generated recursively by a generator 
written in a high-level programming language such as Java 
or C++. In addition, smart contracts written in Solidity can 
be translated into Lolisa, and vice versa, with a line-by-line 
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correspondence, which are operations that can negatively 
impact consistency. Similar to the process of converting 
Fig.8a--d, we develop a translator as a compiler front end to 
automatically convert Solidity programs into the macro 
definitions of the Lolisa abstract syntax tree. The 
abstraction process is given formally by the rule 12. 
Г ⊢ 𝑇𝑜𝑜  (𝑟) ↪      𝑓  𝑎  𝑜  
𝑦   𝑑 
→   .   𝑓      (12) 
Here, in the rule 12, assistant tools function Tools 
employs a specific user requirement 𝑟 with type ℛ as a 
parameter within the proof context 𝛤. Assistant tools then 
generate the respective formal specifications and export 
them as .v files that can be loaded in Coq directly. In this 
manner, the mechanical processes of FSPVM-E 
initialization and translation from Solidity into Lolisa can 
be completed automatically. However, as introduced above, 
the assistant tools of current framework are developed in 
C++ without certification. This limitation will be resovled 
in our next version by developing them in Coq directly. 
 
Assistant Libraries. In standard manual modeling 
technology, different formal models with significantly 
different structures and verification processes can be 
constructed in various programs. Hence, designing a set of 
tactics that automatically verifies models in different 
programs is nearly impossible. However, symbolic 
execution in FSPVM-E corresponds to both function 
evaluation and program verification, as indicated by the rule 
13. 
𝛺,𝛭,ℱ ⊢   𝑃 𝑥 ≡ 𝑃 𝑣  ≡ 𝑃𝑣 𝑟  𝑦  (13) 
Specifically, the verification process 𝑃𝑣 𝑟  𝑦 of different 
programs is equivalent with the respective symbolic 
execution process 𝑃 𝑥  in FSPVM-E. In other words, the 
symbolic execution process unifies the verification 
processes of different programs in higher-order theorem-
proving assistants by simplifying the program evaluation 
process of FEther with different  𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚  𝑜𝑟𝑚   in 
FSPVM-E. Because FEther takes the executable semantics 
of Lolisa as the ISA, FEther execution constitutes a fixed 
and finite semantics set {𝒮 𝑥 0 , 𝒮 𝑥 1 , … , 𝒮 𝑥 𝑛} . 
Accordingly, we can design a corresponding automatic 
tactic set    for each executable semantic 𝒮 𝑥 𝑖, as rule 14. 
∀  , 𝒮 𝑥 𝑖 ↔   ⊲ 𝑇 {  0
 ,   1
 , … ,    
 }  (14) 
This can be expanded to accommodate all possible 
semantic conditions. We exploit this advantage for 
designing primitive automatic tactics to automatically 
execute and verify the properties of smart contracts using 
the Ltac mechanism provided by Coq. As shown in Fig.10, 
the Ltac-based tactic modeling is constructed from three 
components: memory operating tactics (MTS), execution 
tactics (ETS), and verification tactics (VTS). As the 
component names suggest, MTS is applied to evaluate the 
requests of GERM APIs, ETS is used to simplify the 
executable semantics of Lolisa, and VTS can simplify the 
pre conditions and post conditions and complete the 
mathematical reasoning during property verification. The 
workflow of the tactic modeling is also defined in Fig.10. 
For Coq operating in the proof pattern, the 𝑜𝑏  𝑟   (OB) 
function scans the current context 𝐶 to obtain the current 
goal. Each component in sequence attempts to capture the 
operational characteristic of the current goal and select the 
matching tactics. The selected tactics are combined into a 
solution tactic 𝐿 𝑎   that solves the goal in the TCOC. The 
new context 𝐶  is compared with 𝐶 in  𝑜   𝑥 𝑑 𝑐. If 𝐶  
and 𝐶 are identical, the current tactics cannot solve the 
goal automatically, and the tactic modeling process is 
terminated. Otherwise, the tactic modeling continuously 
attempts to simplify the goal of 𝐶 . 
An example of the Ltac-based tactic modeling is given as 
rule 15. 
𝐿 𝑎    𝑓𝑜 𝑑𝑚𝑜𝑑  𝑦 ≔  
𝑚𝑎    𝑔𝑜𝑎  𝑤     
| [ |−  𝑜   𝑥  [? 𝑌 (? 𝑋: 𝑚 𝑚𝑜𝑟 )(? 𝑍:  𝑎   )]] ⇒
  𝑓𝑜 𝑑 𝑌    ∗;   𝑏     ∗  
  𝑑.  (15) 
Here, the unfold_modify tactic is a sub-tactic of a 
memory operation that captures parts of the operational 
characteristics of a specific 𝑤𝑟   𝑑 𝑟  function, and 
evaluates 𝑤𝑟   𝑑 𝑟 using basic built-in tactics. 
 
 
Fig.10. Automatic tactic modeling process based on the Ltac mechanism 
provided by Coq. The process is constructed from three components: 
memory operating tactics (MTS), execution tactics (ETS), and verification 
tactics (VTS), where each component in sequence attempts to capture 
the operational characteristic of the current goal and select the matching 
tactics that are combined into a solution tactic 𝐋𝐭𝐚𝐜𝐢. 
Another assistant library is the static analysis library that 
is used to collect the formal specifications of standard 
vulnerabilities relevant to coding conventions. This static 
analysis module is an independent auxiliary module besides 
the core hybrid verification module. This module is used to 
check the basic and common vulnerabilities, such as such as 
integer overflow, unchecked send bug
4
 and divide zero, to 
reduce workload of hybrid verification and improve 
efficiency of FSPVM-E. These formal specifications are 
used to construct a static analysis mechanism to quickly 
scan for bugs in the source code. The details of this library  
4
 unchecked send bug: http://hackingdistributed.com/2016/06/16/scanning-
live-ethereum-contracts-for-bugs/ 
𝑇𝐶𝑂𝐶 𝐿 𝑎   , 𝑔𝑜𝑎 
𝑜𝑏  𝑟  𝐶
𝑓    𝑟 𝑇 𝑔𝑜𝑎 ↪ 𝐿 𝑎  𝑇 𝑖
𝑓    𝑟𝐸𝑇 𝑔𝑜𝑎 ↪ 𝐿 𝑎 𝐸𝑇 𝑖
𝑓    𝑟 𝑇 𝑔𝑜𝑎 ↪ 𝐿 𝑎  𝑇 𝑖
 
 
𝐿 𝑎  , 𝑔𝑜𝑎 
 𝑜   𝑥 𝑑 𝑐 𝐶, 𝐶 ⇒ 𝐶
′
𝐶  𝐶 
𝐶′
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are discussed in Subsection V.A. 
IV. SELF-CORRECTNESS CERTIFICATION 
An essential issue that must be addressed before we can 
verify smart contracts in FSPVM-E is the self-correctness 
of FSPVM-E. Because FSPVM-E is employed as the TCB 
solver for the evaluation and derivation of the formal 
specification models and properties of smart contracts, the 
credibility of the analysis results is strongly associated with 
the correctness of the TCB. Similarly, ensuring the self-
correctness of the verification TCB for all static analysis 
tools is an unavoidable issue. However, the work of Gödel 
has established that a logic cannot prove its own 
consistency. As such, the fact that verifiers cannot verify 
themselves presents a paradox. Actually, most theorem 
proving assistants based on satisfiability modulo theories 
(SMT) [42] and other types of static analysis tools based on 
symbolic execution technologies assume that their 
computation cores are correct, although correctness has not 
been certified. Therefore, these tools are classified as 
untrusted in many studies. In contrast, one of the most 
important features of FSPVM-E is that its self-correctness 
can be ensured with a very high degree. This is explained in 
the following subsections. Here, we first demonstrate that 
the components of FSPVM-E in the trusted domain of Coq 
can be verified directly. Secondly, we demonstrate that the 
components in the untrusted domain have no effect on the 
self-correctness of FSPVM-E from the perspectives of the 
minimum trusted computational base and the non-aftereffect 
property. 
A. MINIMUM TRUSTED COMPUTATIONAL BASE 
The development of methods to avoid the above-discussed 
paradox has been conducted since the 1940s, and these 
approaches have been summarized for proof assistants [37]. 
Briefly, the manual review of a very small kernel by experts 
and the de Bruijn criterion [43] are two key approaches for 
ensuring the trustworthiness of a proof assistant. However, 
the TCB of most static analysis tools is an untrusted black 
box with a very large kernel that cannot be certified 
mathematically. Nor does it satisfy the de Bruijn criterion. 
This has been addressed by the Coq team by making the 
TCOC very small, which has enabled the correctness of the 
core code to be verified by the manual review of experts. 
Moreover, the TCOC also completely satisfies the de Bruijn 
criterion. In addition, Harrison [44] has proven the 
consistency of the HOL Light logical core (or, strictly 
speaking, a subset of the logical core) using HOL Light 
itself based on the self-verification concept denoted as 
reflection, which is also supported in the TCOC. This proof 
is also completed supported by Coq. Therefore, the TCOC, 
including the fundamental theory and specific 
implementation, is currently widely recognized as one of 
the most reliable trusted cores available.  
Besides, another benefit is that the self-correctness of 
functions and programs developed in Coq using native logic 
language Gallina, denoted as ℱ(𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚) , can be 
certified in Coq directly. 
Taking a very simple example, when we develop an 
addition add in Coq using Gallina language shown as below, 
we can directly define critical properties in Coq by applying 
add function, such as associative property of addition 
plus_assoc shown below, to certify the self-correctness of 
this function directly. 
add = fix add (n m : nat) {struct n} : nat := 
  match n with 
  | 0 => m 
  | S p => S (add p m) 
  end. 
Theorem plus_assoc : ∀ n m p : nat, add n (add m p) = add 
(add n m) p. 
Accordingly, FSPVM-E has a natural advantage 
compared with other program verification or analysis tools 
in that its three essential components are wholly developed 
in Coq, and it employs the TCOC as the TCB. In addition, 
the core components of FSPVM-E, including the GERM 
framework, Lolisa, and FEther, are all implemented using 
the Gallina specification language. Therefore, these are 
respectively denoted as ℱ(𝐺𝐸𝑅𝑀) , ℱ(𝐿𝑜   𝑎) , and 
ℱ(𝐹𝐸   𝑟) . As such, the correctness of these three 
components can be directly certified in Coq. Thus, 
compared with other static analysis tools that must assume 
the correctness of the TCB, the smart contract verifications 
that take the proposed FSPVM-E as the TCB must only 
trust the TCOC. The corresponding verification details are 
given elsewhere [11, 31, 32]. At present, the core functions 
of FSPVM-E, which includes 74 theorems and 183 lemmas 
in Coq, have been completely verified. 
 
Fig.11. Non-aftereffect relation between the dynamically generated 
specifications of assistant tools with the direct certification of their self-
correctness in Coq. 
B. NON-AFTEREFFECT PROPERTY 
Although the kernel of FSPVM-E in Coq is verified, the 
assistant tools are developed in the untrusted domain using 
general-purpose programming languages. Therefore, these 
tools are obviously vulnerable to incorrect specifications 
that can have an impact on the correctness of FSPVM-E. 
However, the correctness of assistant tools is difficult to 
audit and certify. Fortunately, the relationship between the 
assistant tools and their respective results satisfies the non-
aftereffect property. Here, although the assistant tools are 
developed in the untrusted world to automatically generate  
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Fig.12. Summary of FSPVM-E workflow. 
 
the dynamic situation-dependent specifications of FSPVM-
E, these generated specifications are defined using Gallina, 
and therefore can be verified in Coq straightly. Hence, as 
illustrated in Fig.11, the self-correctness of generated 
specifications can be certified in Coq directly. As such, we 
can conclude that the component of FSPVM-E affected by 
generated specifications is correct if the generated 
specifications pass their correctness certifications. As such, 
the correctness of FSPVM-E is not influenced by the means 
through which the assistant tools are implemented. 
V. EXPERIMENT 
We demonstrate the workflow and novel features of our 
new toolchain in real-world practice by applying FSPVM-E 
to formalize and verify a Smart Sponsor Contract (SSC). An 
SSC is a simple but classic Ethereum sponsor contract 
demo for new users on the IBM Cloud Laboratory website 
(https://developer.ibm.com/clouddataservices/2016/05/19/bl
ock-chain-technology-smart-contracts-and-ethereum/). Its 
simplicity makes it an ideal example in the present work. 
This example offers an additional benefit, in that we have 
verified this smart contract in our past work using a 
standard theorem proving approach in Coq [45], and the 
source code can be downloaded from our Gitee site 
(https://gitee.com/zyangFV/SSC-manual-verification). 
Therefore, we can clearly illustrate the advantages of 
FSPVM-E by comparison with our past work. Only the 
necessary code segments are presented in the following 
discussion to enhance the readability; however, the 
complete code of this example is given in the Appendix, 
and can also be downloaded from the cited IBM website. 
The experimental environment employed 5 identical 
personal computers with equivalent hardware, including 8 
GB RAM and a 3.20 GHz CPU, and equivalent software, 
including Windows 10 and CoqIDE 8.6. 
A. CASE STUDY: HYBRID VERIFICATION SYSTEM 
Workflow. The general workflow of FSPVM-E can be 
defined in conjunction with Fig.12 that is explained as 
follows. First, users should provide a smart contract. 
According to the design requirements of smart contracts, 
users should abstract them as pre and post conditions of 
Hoare style properties. Next, users deploy this system in a 
specific circumstance by applying the generator and 
translator provided by the assistant tools. The generated 
formal specifications are certified by the self-correctness 
theorems stored in the assistant libraries before initializing. 
These specifications are adopted in FSPVM-E if they 
satisfy the self-correctness theorems; otherwise, the 
verification process is terminated. The translator 
automatically reads the .sol file, translates the Solidity smart 
contract into the respective formal form in Lolisa, defines 
the program model, and allocates logic memory blocks for 
all variables. Next, the static analysis module will apply the 
predefined theorems about basic vulnerabilities to scan the 
formal version source code of target smart contracts. The 
analysis results will be printed in the proof goals directly. 
After that, the formal specification of smart contracts will 
be parameterized into the properties of program 
requirements which are defined by users manually. Finally, 
the users need to open the proof universe, and the hybrid 
verification engine will finish the verification automatically. 
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𝑺𝒚𝒏𝒕𝒂𝒙  
𝛤[𝒞]: : = 𝐷 | 𝑑 , ( ≥ 0)  
𝒞: : = 𝐷 | ?̅? | 𝑑 | [ 0, … ,   ] 
𝐷: : = 𝐷 | ?̅? | 𝑑  
𝑑: : = [ 0, … ,   ], ( ≥ 0)  
Fig.13. Abstract syntax of a code segment definition in FSPVM-E, where 
𝓒 represents the code segment, 𝚪[𝓒] denotes the current global context 
of 𝓒, 𝐜𝐢 represents a single instruction, 𝐝 represents a child definition, 
𝐝 ̅ denotes possible sequences 𝐝𝟎,…, 𝐝𝐧, and 𝐃 is a set of definitions. 
 
Fig.14. Partial Smart Sponsor Contract (SSC) model. 
A section of the SSC generadted by the translator is 
shown in Fig.13, where 𝒞 represents the code segment, 
𝛤[𝒞]  denotes the current global context of 𝒞 ,    
represents a single instruction, 𝑑  represents a child 
definition, ?̅?  denotes possible sequences 𝑑0 ,…, 𝑑 , and 
𝐷 is a set of definitions. It should be noted that the essence 
of smart contract segment specifications in Coq is a logic 
term with a specific logic type list statement declared by a 
definition, and FEther is driven by the executable semantics 
of each abstract syntax. The abstract syntax of code 
segment definition is also summarized in Fig.13. Hence, 
FEther has no limitations on the size and continuity of an 
input  𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚 𝑜𝑟𝑚  , and even a single statement can be 
defined in the proof context of FSPVM-E and symbolically 
executed by FEther. As an example of the translation 
process, a formal model of a partial SSC (please see the 
Appendix) is shown in Fig.14. In addition, the formal 
version of the pledge function of the SSC is presented in 
Fig.15. We note that the formal version of the pledge 
function is very intuitive, and the critical requirement is the 
pledge operation succeeds if the input value is not 0, and 
the closed flags complete and refunded are false. Finally, 
users need only operate Coq in its proof pattern, and launch 
FSPVM-E to automatically analyze and verify the smart 
contracts based on the requirements specified by the user. 
We provide the following three basic analysis and 
verification mechanisms in FSPVM-E: static analysis, 
hybrid verification, and a debugging mechanism. In Static 
Analysis Mechanism subsection, we will introduce the 
process that static analysis module analyzes the pledge 
function and finds out the basic vulnerabilities. In Hybrid 
Property Verification with Hoare Style subsection, we will 
illustrate the details that hybrid verification engine verifies 
important properties of SSC smart contract. 
 
Static Analysis Mechanism. The static analysis mechanism 
is an independent module, which is embedded within 
FSPVM-E to identify standard vulnerabilities related to 
coding conventions and coding mechanisms in smart 
contracts, such as integer overflow and unchecked send bug, 
rather than the logic of the service design. Of course, these 
vulnerabilities can be accurately identified by defining and 
verifying corresponding theorems, but this process 
generates a heavy and tedious workload. However, these 
vulnerabilities have distinct features that clearly distinguish 
them from logical vulnerabilities, and are accordingly 
identified easily and quickly using conventional static 
analysis technology. Therefore, static analysis is a better 
choice for supporting this type of security. Moreover, the 
line-by-line translation between Lolisa and Solidity ensures 
the consistency between smart contracts and corresponding 
formal models.  
As introduced in Subsection III.D, FSPVM-E includes a 
static analysis library that contains standard vulnerability 
features and scanning functions. The abstract definition of 
  𝑎  function is defined in rule 16. Here, a   𝑎  function 
takes a signed by option type that the all code segments of 
context 𝛤 will be scanned in the static analysis module. 
𝛤[𝒞] ⊢   𝑎 ( 𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚 𝑜𝑟𝑚  , 𝑓 𝑎  𝑟  ) ⇒ ⟦ ⟧  (16) 
If the   𝑎  function locates vulnerabilities, it will 
return 𝑆𝑜𝑚    𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟. Otherwise, it will return 𝑁𝑜  . For 
example, if we want to check if an unchecked send bug 
problem exists in the pledge function, we need only apply 
the corresponding scan function to validate the source code, 
as shown in Fig.16. A scanning result of None indicates that 
the target  𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚 𝑜𝑟𝑚   contains no code segment with 
a potential risk of the corresponding feature 𝑓 𝑎  𝑟  . 
Otherwise, the code segment with the potential vulnerability 
will be located in the proof context. We have encapsulated 
rule 16 in the current version of FSPVM-E with fixed 
features to obtain the following particular scan functions. 
  𝑎     𝑢𝑟 𝑖 ∷        𝑎  𝑚   → 𝑜   𝑜    𝑎  𝑚     
  𝑎     𝑢𝑟 𝑖 ≔ 𝜆 ( :        𝑎  𝑚   ).   𝑎 ( , 𝑓 𝑎  𝑟  )  
In this manner, the generator can automatically replace 
  with the target  𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚 𝑜𝑟𝑚   in all feature scanning 
functions, and automatically analyze  𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚 𝑜𝑟𝑚   
according to all of its vulnerability features. This 
mechanism 
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Fig.15. Formal version of the pledge function of the SSC. 
 
Fig.16. Simple case study of scanning send check vulnerability. 
 
Fig.17. Static symbolic execution process for verifying the pledge function with abstract symbol arguments. 
 
Fig.18. Concolic symbolic execution process for verifying the pledge function. 
 
provides FSPVM-E with the following advantages. First, it 
provides an optional choice for users to check individual 
security vulnerabilities efficiently. Second, higher-order 
logic can be employed to formalize specifications that are 
more complex than standard specifications. Thirdly, the 
static analysis library can be extended by adding new 
specifications and functions for new vulnerabilities. Finally, 
as discussed in Subsection IV.A, this mechanism is 
completely developed in Coq, so its correctness can be 
certified in Coq. Currently, the demo version of FSPVM-E 
can scan integer overflow, stack overflow and unchecked 
send bug. 
Of course, like similar conventional mechanisms, this 
mechanism also has the potential for issuing false alarms 
and providing insufficient error reporting. Therefore, it is 
provided only as an optional and independent assistant 
mechanism for users to employ prior to property 
verification. To our best knowledge, this is the first time 
that a static analysis mechanism has been embedded within 
a Coq proof system for Ethereum validation. 
 
Hybrid Property Verification with Hoare Style. As 
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discussed in Section I, potential legal loopholes in smart 
contracts represent subtle bugs that cannot be detected by 
standard scanning technologies because these loopholes are 
closely related to the logic of the specific source code. 
Solving this problem by means of automated theorem 
proving represents the most important core function of 
FSPVM-E. Here, FSPVM-E automatically verifies the 
requirement properties defined by users based on higher-
order logic using Hoare style proof derivations according to 
the rule 17 which contains three parts. 
P{minit}FEther(minit, programformal,∗)Q{mfinal} (17) 
First, the precondition 𝑃  is defined by the initial 
memory state 𝑚    . The 𝑚     stores the essential 
constraints that are formalized based on smart contracts 
design requirements.  
Second, the 𝐹𝐸   𝑟 (𝑚    ,  𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚 𝑜𝑟𝑚  ,∗)  is the 
entry point of the symbolic execution engine. 𝐹𝐸   𝑟 
should take 𝑚    , the target smart contract 
 𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚 𝑜𝑟𝑚  , and other inputs as parameters.  
Third, the postcondition 𝑄 is defined by the expected 
final memory state 𝑚     , which represents the expected 
obligation of  𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚 𝑜𝑟𝑚  . 
This method has no strict restrictions on the specification 
form of initial and final memory state definitions. The 
property formalization process will be given as a case study 
in the next subsection. 
Because the Hoare logic derivation is equivalent to the 
trusted execution of operational semantics, the execution of 
FEther can be seen as a derivation process based on Hoare 
logic following the executable semantics of Lolisa.  
𝑃{𝑚    } 0
𝐹𝐸 ℎ 𝑟(𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡,𝑐0,∗)
→             
{
 
 
 
 
𝐹𝐸 ℎ 𝑟(𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡,𝑐0,∗)
→             𝑄0
0{𝑚0
0} 1
𝐹𝐸 ℎ 𝑟(𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡,𝑐0,∗)
→             𝑄0
1{𝑚0
1} 1
…
𝐹𝐸 ℎ 𝑟(𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡,𝑐0,∗)
→             𝑄0
 {𝑚0
 } 1
↠
{
 
 
  𝑄 
0{𝑚 
0}
  Qn
1 {mn
1}
…
  𝑄 
𝑗{𝑚 
𝑗 }
?
↔𝑄{𝑚     },  ≥ 0, 𝑗 ≥ 0  (18) 
The inference process is given by the rule 18. Beginning 
with 𝑚     as the precondition of program verification, 
FEther generates all possible proof subgoals, and logically 
modifies the current memory state 𝑚 −1
𝑗 , (𝑗 ∈ ℕ) 
according to the semantics of each statement ci to generate 
all possible new postconditions 𝑄 
𝑗{𝑚 
𝑗}  (i.e., the 
preconditions of ci ). The theorems need only judge 
whether the final output memory state 𝑚  obtained after 
executing the final statement matches the correct memory 
state 𝑚     . Specifically, users need only apply the 
automatic tactics to automatically complete the symbolic 
execution of  𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚 𝑜𝑟𝑚  , and prove the equivalence 
between the results of 𝐹𝐸   𝑟 (𝑚    ,  𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚 𝑜𝑟𝑚  ,∗) 
and 𝑄{𝑚     }. If the equivalence is true,  𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚 𝑜𝑟𝑚   
satisfies the respective property theorem. 
Because the FEther is a black box for users, general 
programmers need only be familiar with the mechanical 
process of applying assistant tools and defining the initial 
and final memory states with Hoare style logic. Therefore, 
FSPVM-E reduces the difficulty with which general 
programmers can apply higher-order theorem proving 
technology to verify their smart contracts in Coq. In 
addition, users can alter the symbolic execution process 
(including static, concolic, and selective symbolic execution) 
during the verification process by defining the 
preconditions in different ways. This is explained in the 
following subsections taking the pledge function of the SSC 
as an example. 
 
1) Static Symbolic Execution. The basic verification 
process is based on conventional symbolic execution. When 
the initial arguments are inductively defined with 
quantifiers such as ∀ and ∃, the verification engine FEther 
will follow the logic of the source code to traverse all cases 
that satisfy the preconditions. Specifically, according to the 
requirement given in Workflow subsection, if one of the 
sponsor termination flags  𝑜𝑚      and 𝑟 𝑓  𝑑 is set as 
true or the donation amount is zero, the smart contract must 
be discarded. Following this requirement, the property 
formalization is given bellow. 
First, the Lemma pledge_false defined in Fig.17 
initializes (Bool (Some ? 𝑋)) , (Bool (Some ? 𝑌)) , and 
(INT I64 Signed? 𝑍) by specifying ? 𝑋 , ? 𝑌 , and ? 𝑍  as 
inductive values representing all possible conditions of 
initial termination flags and the donation amount, namely, 
as ∀ (  : 𝑏𝑜𝑜 )(𝐵𝑜𝑜  (𝑆𝑜𝑚    )) , 
∀ (𝑟𝑓: 𝑏𝑜𝑜 )(𝐵𝑜𝑜  (𝑆𝑜𝑚  𝑟𝑓)) , and 
∀ (  𝑚:    )(𝐼𝑁𝑇 𝐼64 𝑆 𝑔  𝑑? 𝑍), respectively.  
Specifically, the initial memory states 𝑚  to 𝑚4  that 
satisfy the pledge function and other essential preconditions 
are defined first.  
Second, according to the requirement, the constraint of 
donation amont,  𝑜𝑚      and 𝑟 𝑓  𝑑  are defined as 
money = 0 ∨  𝑜𝑚     =  𝑟  ∨ 𝑟 𝑓  𝑑 = true. 
Third, the formal specification fun_pledge and 
preconditions are given into the entry pointer of FEther, 
denoted as test. Next, the expected postcondition that the 
pledge function is not applied successfully is defined as 
𝑆𝑜𝑚      _𝑚  in Fig.17. 
Finally, users need only mechanically apply the 
compositive automatic tactics to initialize the preconditions 
as the initial execution environment, symbolically execute 
fun_pledge, and verify the equivalence between the 
execution result and the postcondition by forward reasoning. 
This represents the complete property verification process. 
Programmers can execute and complete this property 
verification using the automatic tactics of FEther within 
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0.861 s (right-hand side of Fig.17). 
 
2) Concolic Symbolic Execution. Because Coq is also a 
kind of functional programming language, it supports the 
evaluation of specific real inputs. As shown in Fig.18, the 
entry points test and code pledge are unmodified, and 
complete and refunded are replaced with specific values 
true and false, respectively. The other constraints are still 
inductively defined as abstract symbols. The functional 
correctness with the specific inputs is then proven by the 
lemma pledge_false. Because the inputs are specified, the 
number of possible execution paths is limited, and the 
execution time is reduced to 0.222 s (right-hand side of 
Fig.18). This mechanism leaves extensible space support 
for standard testing. Users can extend the generator or 
implement a new test mechanism to automatically generate 
test script to modify the initial arguments and validate target 
programs. 
 
3) Selective Symbolic Execution. This verification process 
allows programmers to extract segments of code from target 
programs, verify the properties of the selected code 
segments separately, and apply these verified properties to 
simplify the verification process of target programs. For 
example, a code segment 𝒞 can be redefined as follows. 
𝒞 ≝ 𝑑𝑐 = [ 0, . . ,   ] + +⋯+ +[ 𝑗, . . ,  𝑘] + +⋯+
+[ 𝑚, . . ,   ] + +⋯+ +[ 𝑦, . . ,  𝑧]  
= [ 0, . . ,   ] + +⋯+ +𝑑 + +⋯+ +𝑑𝑗 + +⋯+
+[ 𝑚, . . ,   ] ⊳ 𝛤
′(𝑑 ≝ [ 𝑗, . . ,  𝑘], 𝑑𝑗 ≝ [ 𝑚, . . ,   ])  
= [ 0, . . ,   ] + +⋯+ +𝑑 + +⋯+ +𝐷𝑘 ⊳ 𝛤
′ (𝑑 ≝
[ 𝑗, . . ,  𝑘], 𝐷𝑘 ≝ 𝑑𝑗 ⊳ 𝛤
′′(𝑑𝑗 ≝ [ 𝑚, . . ,   ]))  
𝑉 𝑟 𝑓 (𝒞) = 𝑉 𝑟 𝑓 ([ 0, . . ,   ] + +⋯+ +𝑑 + +⋯+
+𝐷𝑘)  
Therefore, the key point is whether 𝑉 𝑟 𝑓 ([ 0, . . ,   ] +
+⋯+ +𝑑 + +⋯+ +𝐷𝑘)  is equivalent to 
𝑉 𝑟 𝑓 ([ 0, . . ,   ]) + +⋯+ +𝑉 𝑟 𝑓 (𝑑 ) + +⋯+
+𝑉 𝑟 𝑓 (𝐷𝑘). 
First of all, any code segment 𝑑 that satisfies the syntax 
given in Fig.13 will not be unfolded and executed and 
verified in FEther according to the rule 19. 
𝑃{𝑚    } 0
𝐹𝐸 ℎ 𝑟(𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡,𝑐0,∗)
→             𝑄0{𝑚0}𝑑
𝐹𝐸 ℎ 𝑟(𝑚0,𝑑,∗)
→          𝑄1{𝑚1}  ↠ ⋯
?
↔𝑄{𝑚     }  (19) 
Obviously, we obtain the result 𝑃𝑑{𝑚𝑑} 𝑑 𝑄𝑑{𝑚𝑑 } , 
which means that, according to the purposed precondition 
𝑃𝑑{𝑚𝑑}, 𝐹𝐸   𝑟(𝑚𝑑, 𝑑,∗) will obtain the expected logic 
state 𝑄{𝑚𝑑 }. In addition, because Coq employs a call-by-
name evaluation strategy [46], the bodies of all definitions, 
including functions and values, are stored in their own 
contexts, and are not evaluated until they are needed in the 
current proof context 𝛤𝑐. Therefore, any segment 𝑑 of the 
logic expression 𝜀 in the current proof context will not be 
unfolded during the proof process until all instructions prior 
to 𝑑 have been executed in the proof context, as indicated 
by the rule 20, where ⊳ denotes the binary  
 
Fig.19. Selective symbolic execution process for verifying the pledge function. 
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relationship that each context has subcontext with 
enscapluated definitions recursively. 
𝛤⊳𝒟(𝑑𝛤,𝛤
′⊳𝒟(𝑑
𝛤′
,𝛤′′⊳𝒟(𝑑
𝛤′′
,… )))⊢𝜀
 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
→         𝜀𝑛𝑓
𝛤′⊳𝒟(𝑑𝛤′ ,𝛤
′′⊳𝒟(𝑑𝛤′′ ,… ))⊢𝜀𝑛𝑓 𝑑𝛤
  (20) 
Moreover, if a proposition 𝑄  is a subset of a 
proposition 𝑃 , 𝑃  can imply 𝑄 , which is denoted as 
∀ 𝑄. 𝑄 ⊆ 𝑃 ⊢ 𝑃 → 𝑄. This is formalized as the rule 21. 
𝑃{𝑚    } ↠ 𝑄𝑐{𝑚𝑐}⊆𝑃𝑑{𝑚𝑑} 𝑑 𝑄𝑑{𝑚𝑑 }
 𝑝 𝑐  𝑦
→     𝑄𝑑𝑐{𝑚𝑑 𝑐}   ↠ ⋯
?
↔𝑄{𝑚     }  (21) 
Here, if the final logic memory state 𝑄𝑐{𝑚𝑐} of the 
instruction set   prior to 𝑑 is a subset of the precondition 
𝑃𝑑{𝑚𝑑}, which has already been verified, 𝑃𝑑{𝑚𝑑} can be 
specified as 𝑄𝑐{𝑚𝑐} by applying 𝑃𝑑{𝑚𝑑} → 𝑄𝑐{𝑚𝑐}, and 
𝑄𝑑{𝑚𝑑 } can also be determined according to the specific 
𝑃𝑑{𝑚𝑑}. This process is executed, and can be automatically 
completed in Coq using the eapply, eauto, and Hint Resolve 
tactics. As introduced previously, FSPVM-E takes the 
GERM logic memory state as the pre and post conditions in 
the Hoare triple. Therefore, the excepted abstract or specific 
final memory state of   can be taken as the initial memory 
state of 𝑑 . Obviously, if   is correct, its final logic 
memory state is a subset of its expected logic memory state. 
The same procedure can be adapted to an arbitrary 
definition set 𝐷. Hence, specifying all preconditions of 𝑑 
and 𝐷  by the input post conditions yields 
𝑉 𝑟 𝑓 ([ 0, . . ,   ] + +⋯+ +𝑑 + +⋯+ +𝐷𝑘) =
𝑉 𝑟 𝑓 ([ 0, . . ,   ]) + +⋯+ +𝑉 𝑟 𝑓 (𝑑 ) + +⋯+
+𝑉 𝑟 𝑓 (𝐷𝑘). 
As shown by the example in Fig.19, the pledge function 
can be varied by exploiting the selective symbolic execution 
of FEther. Programmers can extract the core code segment 
 𝑓 (𝑚 𝑔.  𝑎   = 0 ||  𝑜𝑚     ||𝑟 𝑓 𝑑) {  𝑟𝑜𝑤(); }  
from the pledge function and redefine it as a new formal 
definition 𝑑 denoted as fun_pledge_if, as shown in the red 
box, which can in turn be independently verified by the 
pledge_false_select lemma. After combining the verified 
fun_pledge_if code segment into the pledge function, the 
verification of the pledge_false theorem can be completed 
by invoking the pledge_false_select lemma. Clearly, the 
pledge_false_select lemma can also assist in any other 
proofs that use the fun_pledge_if code segment. 
Capitalizing on this feature, FSPVM-E is able to improve 
its reusability and mitigate the effects of path explosion by 
extracting important or universal code segments, and 
verifying them separately. The details of this process are 
discussed in Subsection V.D. 
 
4) Debugging Mechanism. Finally, FEther provides an 
interactive debugging mechanism for users. Because FEther 
is developed based on the GERM memory model, the 
formal intermediate memory states record the proof 
information, such as logic invariants and expressions, of all 
variables during the execution and verification process. The 
proposed mechanism employs the debugging tactic 
step_debug to enable the  
 
Fig.20. Example of the debugging mechanism provided by FSPVM-E. 
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Fig.21. Formal intermediate memory states during the verification process of the pledge function. 
step-by-step debugging of a smart contract by manually 
tracing these intermediate memory states. As shown in 
Fig.20, the states of all memory blocks at the current break 
point are printed in the proof context. Programmers can 
extract a target code segment using selective symbolic 
execution with debugging tactics, and trace the intermediate 
memory states to locate bugs. Fig.21 shows the formal 
intermediate memory states obtained during the execution 
and verification of the pledge function using FEther in the 
proof context. Then, we can compare the mechanized 
verification results and the manually obtained results to 
validate the semantics of Lolisa. In addition, the application 
of FEther based on Lolisa and the GERM framework also 
certifies that our proposed FSPVM-E is feasible. Here, the 
logic memory states during execution can be observed in 
the proof context. 
B. ADVANCED FSPVM-E FEATURES 
The advanced features of the purposed FSPVM-E include 
consistency, automation, and evaluation efficiency, which 
are summarized individually in the following subsections. 
 
Consistency. The consistency feature of FSPVM-E includes 
language formalization consistency and execution and 
verification consistency. 
1) Language Formalization Consistency. This consistency 
feature refers to the line-by-line translation between Solidity 
and Lolisa following the formalized syntax of Solidity. 
Many well known higher-order logic theorem proving 
frameworks, such as deep specifications [23], require 
researchers to manually abstract or rebuild the resource 
code of target programs as computational formal 
specifications in higher-order logic theorem proof assistants, 
and the overall process depends entirely on the experience, 
knowledge, and proficiency of researchers rather than on a 
standardized and mechanized criterion. As a result, the 
consistency between the formal model and the original 
program cannot be ensured formally, which represents one 
of the most troubling problems associated with higher-order 
theorem proving technology. As shown in Fig.22, which 
was extracted from our previous work [33], the abstract 
formal specification of the pledge function in the Gallina 
specification language is far different from the 
corresponding source code given in Fig.15 and the 
Appendix, even though it accurately defines the behavior of 
the pledge function. This flexibility in the abstraction and 
translation processes leads to a general lack of consistency 
between the formalization results obtained by different 
researchers, and the consistency between formal 
specifications and corresponding source programs is also 
very difficult to certify. As a result, the formal model runs 
the risk of misunderstanding the source program logic and 
implementation, and may import vulnerabilities not existing 
in the original program, or remove vulnerabilities existing 
in the source code as an unintended result of the abstraction 
and translation processes. 
 
Fig.22. Manually translated version of the formalized pledge function [45]. 
Although, in current FSPVM-E, the translator is 
developed in untrusted domain using C++ that we cannot 
guarantee the correctness of it, as indicated by the following 
rule 
 𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑟𝑤 ∈ 𝑆𝑜  𝑑   ∧ 𝒯( 𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑟𝑤) ∈ 𝐿𝑜   𝑎 ⊢
 𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑟𝑤 ≡  𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚 𝑜𝑟𝑚    (22) 
where the symbol 𝒯 represents the translation process, in 
contrast with conventional approaches, Lolisa has 
mechanized most syntax and corresponding semantics of 
Solidity into Coq. In addition, the formal syntax of Lolisa 
has also been encapsulated into the syntactic abbreviations 
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using the Notation macro mechanism, and hides the fixed 
formal syntactic components. Benefiting from this, 
theoretically, the formal version of smart contracts is very 
similar to their original version, so the equivalency of small 
size smart contracts could be reviewed by experts or third-
party plug-ins. Hence, as demonstrated by Figs.14 and 15, 
smart contracts can be translated from Solidity into Lolisa 
line-by-line. Therefore, rule 22 above can be transformed 
into the following rule: 
 𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚 𝑜𝑟𝑚  ≡  𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑    (23) 
and  𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚 𝑜𝑟𝑚   can be directly executed and verified 
in Coq with the help of FEther. Accordingly, 
 𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚 𝑜𝑟𝑚   is actually the corresponding formal 
specification model  𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑   at the code level. 
Furthermore, according to logic transitivity, rules 8, 19, and 
23 can be combined to obtain the following rule. 
 𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑟𝑤 ∈ 𝑆𝑜  𝑑   ∧ 𝒯( 𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑟𝑤) ∈ 𝐿𝑜   𝑎 ⊢
 𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑟𝑤 ≡  𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚 𝑜𝑟𝑚  ≡  𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑    (24) 
Therefore, the target smart contract  𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑟𝑤  is 
consistent with its formal model  𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑   in the 
proposed FSPVM-E. 
Because a simple translator can translate Solidity into 
Lolisa line-by-line automatically, and researchers can check 
the consistency between  𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚 𝑜𝑟𝑚   and 
 𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑  , this process ensures the objectivity of the 
formal model, and depends in no way on the experience, 
knowledge, and proficiency of researchers. Thus, this 
process guarantees consistency between the source program 
and the respective formal model. Although the equivalence 
between Solidity and Lolisa cannot be totally guaranteed in 
current version FSPVM-E due to the limitation of the 
translator, this is a best effort to preserve the equivalence 
between two languages. Besides, we also have planned to 
develop a trusted translator in Coq directly. 
 
2) Execution and Verification Consistency. The execution 
consistency refers to the accuracy with which the symbolic 
execution of smart contracts in FSPVM-E simulates the 
actual behaviors of smart contracts when they are executed 
in the real world. As elaborated by the design and the case 
studies given above, this feature is successfully facilitated in 
FSPVM-E by several ways. First, the GERM framework 
virtualizes the architecture and operations of real world 
memory hardware, and the semantics of Solidity has been 
mechanized into Coq as the core of FEther. Moreover, 
Ethereum smart contracts written in Lolisa can be directly 
executed in FSPVM-E. Hence, the execution and 
verification level of FEther functions directly on what is 
essentially Solidity code rather than byte code, which 
avoids the risk of errors during compilation. Therefore, the 
symbolic execution of target smart contracts in FSPVM-E 
accurately reflects their behaviors in the formal systems of 
Coq. 
Automation. As demonstrated by the case studies, another 
very important feature of FSPVM-E is its high level 
automation of higher-order theorem proving. The ratio of 
source code size to proof code size in many conventional 
higher-order theorem proving approaches (e.g., [23, 47]) 
varies linearly in the range of about 20: 1 to 40: 1, and the 
workload can be summarized by the rule 25, including the 
size of manual formalization and verification. 
𝑤𝑜𝑟  𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑚  𝑢  =
    (𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎   𝑎  𝑜 ) +     (  𝑟 𝑓  𝑎  𝑜 ) +
    ( 𝑟𝑜  𝑟  )  (25) 
Similar to these conventional approaches, properties 
must be manually defined in FSPVM-E. However, the size 
of the source code and the size of the proof code no longer 
have any direct relationship in FSPVM-E owing to the high 
level of automation of the formalization and verification 
processes. 
The individual components of the workload for FSPVM-
E (i.e., 𝑤𝑜𝑟  𝑜𝑎𝑑𝐹 𝑃  −𝐸) can be analyzed as follows. 
First, as introduced in the above discussion regarding 
language formalization consistency, the formalization 
process is entirely unified as a line-by-line translation from 
Solidity to Lolisa, and we have already implemented a 
translator to make the translation process fully automatic. 
Therefore,     (𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎   𝑎  𝑜 )  is zero. Second, the 
ability of most mainstream interactive proof assistants, such 
as Coq and Isabelle, to reduce the workload associated with 
verification is limited, despite the fact that they provide 
tactic mechanisms to help users design proving tactics to 
simplify the program evaluation process and construct 
proofs automatically. This is because the above discussed 
differences among the different formal models derived from 
manual design make it difficult to design tactics that can 
verify formal models in a fully automatic fashion. However, 
in contrast to conventional verification approaches and 
frameworks, FSPVM-E standardizes the verification 
process as the execution of smart contracts in FSPVM-E 
according to rule 13. In addition, as discussed in Subsection 
III.D, the finite number of executable semantics and 
operations in FSPVM-E facilitates the development of 
design strategy sets to automatically accommodate all 
possible semantic conditions, and these strategies are 
encapsulated as three basic tactics. The substantial 
reduction in     (  𝑟 𝑓  𝑎  𝑜 ) facilitated by FSPVM-E 
is well illustrated by comparing the verification of the 
pledge_false theorem shown in Fig.17, which requires only 
a single line of code, with that obtained by directly 
verifying pledge_false using the conventional tactics of Coq, 
as shown in Fig.23, which requires 20 lines of complex 
tactics. dThese three basic tactics can be applied manually 
or invoked automatically with the help of script programs. 
According to these features of FSPVM-E, 
    (  𝑟 𝑓  𝑎  𝑜 ) can be reduced to zero theoretically. 
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Fig.23. Verification of the pledge function using the built-in tactics of Coq. 
Finally, the above discussion indicates that 
𝑤𝑜𝑟  𝑜𝑎𝑑𝐹 𝑃  −𝐸  is related only to the size of the 
verification properties, i.e., 𝑤𝑜𝑟  𝑜𝑎𝑑𝐹 𝑃  −𝐸 =
    ( 𝑟𝑜  𝑟  ), which depends on the complexity of the 
requirements of target programs rather than on the size of 
their source code. 
 
Fig.24. Comparison of the verification workloads of a conventional 
theorem proving approach and FSPVM-E for SSCs. 
Fig.24 shows that, compared with our previous work for 
SSC verification [45], the workload of FSPVM-E has been 
significantly reduced. Here, the workload of the 
formalization and verification processes in our previous 
work are 1283 lines of Coq, which represents a source code 
size to proof code size ratio of about 27: 1. However, the 
manual workload in FSPVM-E is only 210 lines of Coq, 
which represents a source code size to proof code size ratio 
of about 4: 1. 
 
High Evaluation Efficiency. Although high level 
automated verification is very important, the computing 
efficiency of the formal verification engine is also an 
essential evaluation criterion. Our previous version of 
FEther obtained good computing efficiency during 
verification relative to most verification tools for which the 
computing efficiency is generally quite low. However, we 
found that call-by-name termination (CBNT), information 
redundancy explosion (IRE), and concurrent reduction (CR) 
problems could greatly reduce the computational efficiency 
of FEther when verifying large programs. Therefore, we 
have applied the optimization algorithms in [33] that are 
dedicated to solving these problems to optimize FEther. 
Briefly, if the CBNT, IRE, and CR problems are triggered 
simultaneously, the evaluation strategy of higher-order logic 
proof assistants will cause FEther to employ the entire 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚 𝑜𝑟𝑚   rather than a single statement as an 
evaluation unit, which generates a very large amount of 
redundant logic information. This condition is summarized 
by the formulae 26 where   𝑜 𝑢𝑏 represents the average 
number of constructors without sub-branches,   𝑢𝑏 
represents the average number of constructors with sub-
branches,   𝑢𝑏𝑗 and   𝑜 𝑢𝑏𝑗 represent the number of sub-
branches of   𝑢𝑏𝑖  ( , 𝑗 ∈ ℕ, 0 ≤  ≤ 𝑗), 𝑟0 to 𝑟  represent 
the number of values constructed by different datatypes, 
and     0 to       represent the number of constructors 
for each respective datatype. In addition,   𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑧  also 
contains basic expressions and definitions that can be 
evaluated directly, and the average number of these basic 
expressions and definitions are defined as     and 𝑑  , 
respectively. 
  𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑧 ≡ (∑ (   + 𝑑  +   𝑜 𝑢𝑏𝑖 + [
𝑟0 … 𝑟 ] ∗  =0
[
    0
…
     
]) ∗   𝑢𝑏𝑖−1!) +     ( 𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚 𝑜𝑟𝑚  )  (26) 
The previous version of FEther was developed strictly 
following standard interpreter tutorials that explicitly 
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declare sequence statement semantics. As such, the basic 
functionality of this version can be illustrated by the 
following simple conditional statement of 𝑜𝑏  𝑔𝑎  𝑜  ℎ𝑟𝑜𝑤 
rule 27. 
𝑜𝑏  𝑔𝑎  𝑜  ℎ𝑟𝑜𝑤 ≝
∀( ,  ′:   𝑎  𝑚   ),  𝑓 ( 𝑟  ){  h𝑟𝑜𝑤 (); }     { ; }   (27) 
This simple code segment will execute  h𝑟𝑜𝑤 ()  to 
throw out an executing program and return the initial 
memory state 𝑚     when the condition ( 𝑎   == 0 ∨
 𝑜𝑚     𝑑 ∨ 𝑟 𝑓 𝑑) is evaluated as true. However, the 
evaluation process of 𝑜𝑏  𝑔𝑎  𝑜  ℎ𝑟𝑜𝑤  generates 10,736 
lines of logic expressions, and, as shown in Fig.25, 
executing (i.e., verifying) this very simple code segment 
using the non-optimized development of FEther requires an 
execution time of 92.546 s, which is unacceptably long. 
In response to this issue, we optimized FEther [32] by 
applying three proposed optimization schemes, including 
redefining semantics, deeply embedding, and multiple 
pumps. This optimized version of FEther is that employed 
for the proposed FSPVM-E discussed in the present report. 
The current version of FEther takes a single statement as an 
evaluation unit, as indicated by the rule 28. Here, we assign 
  𝛤  as the number of basic optimal expressions in the 
context 𝛤, and assign 𝑑 𝛤 and 𝑑 𝑔 as the number of all 
bound names of definitions and general definitions in the 
context 𝛤, which are the entry points of the respective 
definition bodies. 
  𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑧 ≡   𝛤 + 𝑑 𝛤 + 𝑑 𝑔 +     (  𝑎  𝑚   ) (28) 
In this manner, the logic information size of an 
evaluation unit is maintained within a stable range without 
being affected by the size of the program. A comparison of 
the result given in Fig.25 for the verification of 
𝑜𝑏  𝑔𝑎  𝑜  ℎ𝑟𝑜𝑤  using the non-optimized version of 
FEther with the result given in Fig.26 using the current 
version of FEther indicates that the symbolic execution time 
was decreased from 92.546 s to 0.035 s. As such, the 
optimized version requires just 3/10000 of the time required 
by the non-optimized version. In fact, the entire example 
verifications presented in Subsection V.A required less than 
1 s. In addition, we also compared the results obtained with 
the optimized and non-optimized versions of FEther under 
equivalent experimental environments with an equivalent 
data set extracted from a previous study. Under the 
experimental environment given above, each computer 
executed the same data set 150 times to obtain the average 
number of executions required by the FEther evaluation 
process. In addition, we set an execution time limit of 3600 
s to obtain sufficient experimental data. The experimental 
environments included a specific initial state and an abstract 
initial state, whose initial arguments of the programs are 
defined inductively using quantifiers (such as ∀ and ∃) to 
logically express all possibilities. As shown in Fig.27, the 
average execution times of the non-optimized version of 
FEther with both the specific initial state (SpecNOp) and 
the abstract initial state (AbsNOp) increase rapidly with an 
increasing number of program lines, and exceed the time 
limitation of 3600 s after executing about 30 and 20 
program lines, respectively. Moreover, the ranges of 
fluctuations in the execution times are large, as indicated by 
the error bars. In contrast, the optimized version of FEther 
with both the specific initial state (SpecOp) and the abstract 
initial state (AbsOp) exhibit a steadily increasing average 
execution time with respect to an increasing number of 
program lines. In addition, the error bars are much smaller 
in this case. These results indicate that the execution 
efficiency of the current version of FEther far exceeded that 
of the previous non-optimized version of FEther developed 
in Coq in accordance with the standard tutorial. 
 
 
 
Fig.25. Execution time of the original non-optimized version of FEther for the simple conditional statement pledge obligation given in (35). 
 
Fig.26. Execution time of the optimized version of FEther for the simple conditional statement pledge obligation given in (35). 
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Fig.27. Comparison of the average evaluation times of optimized (Op) and non-optimized (NOp) FEther under specific initial states (Spec) and abstract 
initial states (Abs) for previously published example smart contracts [4] as a function of the number of program lines. 
 
Fig.28. Architecture for extending the core components of FSPVM-E to 
support other general-purpose programming languages of multiple 
blockchain platforms. 
VI. EXTENSIBILITY AND UNIVERSALITY 
While ensuring that the developed Ethereum-based 
verification platform faithfully captures the intended service 
properties of smart contracts written in Solidity is essential, 
further ensuring that this development can be applied to 
multiple blockchain platforms is also of great value. 
Therefore, implementing extensibility and universality in 
the FSPVM-E design was a goal considered from the 
beginning of its development. 
First, we note that the implementations of the GERM 
framework and the assistant tools and libraries are not 
dependent on high-level specifications. Therefore, these 
components of FSPVM-E can be extended by adding new 
independent types, function specifications, and theorems to 
support new requirements. The means of facilitating this 
extensibility were briefly introduced in previous sections. 
Thus, the extensibility and universality of FSPVM-E are 
highly dependent on the extensibility of Lolisa and FEther. 
We deliberately incorporated sufficient extensible space in 
Lolisa and FEther to extend features, such as pointer 
formalization and the implementation of independent 
operator definitions. The architecture of the proposed 
preliminary scheme for extending Lolisa and FEther to 
other general-purpose programming languages is illustrated 
in Fig.28. Extensibility is further realized by the 
independence of syntax inductive predicates in the same 
level, which is further supported in the definitions of the 
semantics. Therefore, Lolisa can be extended to incorporate 
the features of other languages by adding new typing rule 
constructors in the formal abstract syntax and the 
corresponding formal semantics in FEther. As shown in 
Fig.28, except for the accommodation of specific Solidity 
data structures, such as contracts and mapping, the 
remainder of the Lolisa syntax definitions and semantics 
were designed to be universally applicable to any other 
general-purpose programming language. Furthermore, 
Lolisa and FEther were designed based on the GERM 
framework, which are appropriate for the formalization of 
any programming language. Finally, as discussed previously, 
the complex Lolisa formal syntax is hidden in the syntactic 
abbreviations, which improves user-friendliness 
significantly. 
We treat Lolisa as the core formal language, which is 
transparent for real-world users, and we logically classify 
the formal syntax and semantics of Lolisa according to a 
general component 𝒢 and n special components 𝒮 ,  
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65
SpecNOp 0 30.574 39.334 59.451 136.45 579.66 3405
AbsNOp 0 203.53 308.15 723 3393.1
SpecOp 0 0.166 0.291 0.428 0.64 0.729 1.06 1.153 1.202 1.379 1.57 1.703 1.892 2.015
AbsOp 0 0.374 0.606 1.038 1.283 1.509 1.85 2.074 2.306 2.829 3.07 3.22 3.581 3.972
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TABLE 5 
FEATURE COMPARISONS OF FETHER SEMANTICS AND EXISTING SOFTWARE QUALITY TOOLS 
Tool Spec. Exec. Certif. Verif. Debug. Gas Level Logic Hybrid 
Lem spec Yes Yes Testing Yes No No Byte code Higher order No 
Mythril Yes Yes Testing Yes Yes Yes Byte code First order No 
Hsevm No Yes Testing No Yes No Byte code None No 
Scilla 
Solidity* 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Testing 
Verifying 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Intermediate 
Intermediate 
Higher order 
First order 
No 
No 
Cpp-ethereum No Yes Testing No No No Byte code None No 
KEVM Yes Yes Testing Yes Yes Yes Byte code First order Yes 
FSPVM-E Yes Yes Verifying Yes Yes Yes Solidity Higher order Yes 
 
as defined by the rule 29. 
𝐿𝑜   𝑎 ≝ 𝒢 ∪ (⋃ 𝒮 
 
 =0 )  (29) 
As a result, a general-purpose programming language ℒ  
can be formalized by the Lolisa subset 𝒢 ∪ 𝒮  by 
encapsulating the subset using notation as a symbolic 
abbreviation 𝒩  for ℒ , which adopts syntax symbols that 
are nearly equivalent to the original syntax symbols of ℒ . 
With this method, each ℒ  has a corresponding notation set 
𝒩  that satisfies 𝒩 ⊆ 𝐿𝑜   𝑎. This relation is defined by 
the rule 30. 
∀ ∈ ℕ. ℒ ↔𝒩 ≡ 𝒢 ∪ 𝒮   (30) 
As the corresponding definitional interpreter of Lolisa, 
FEther inherits the extensibility advantages of Lolisa. At the 
same level, any executable semantic 𝑆 𝑥  is independent of 
any other semantics, and all same-level semantics are 
encapsulated into an independent module Therefore, FEther 
is also extendible to new executable semantics to support 
new abstract syntax of Lolisa without affecting the old 
semantics. 
VII. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORK 
Compared with most recent tools based on symbolic 
execution, FSVPM-E supports symbolic execution in 
higher-order logic systems. Benefiting from this feature, 
FSPVM-E not only can flexibly formalize and verify 
properties of Ethereum-based services with Hoare style, but 
also obtains higher evaluation efficiency and degree of 
automation compared to standard higher-order logic 
theorem proving technologies. Moreover, FSPVM-E 
provides a formal memory model, a virtual symbolic 
execution environment, and single statement unit evaluation, 
which solves the memory, environment, and constraint 
solving problems of conventional tools based on symbolic 
execution. Moreover, FSPVM-E is first the verification 
system that provides a large subset of Solidity formal syntax 
and semantics with GADTs, and it is also the first proof 
virtual machine can directly execute and verify Solidity 
programs in Coq. 
To compare differences between FSPVM-E and the 
related works that have pulished open-source tools 
introduced in Section I, more intuitively, we summarized 
the differences in Table 5. The compared features are listed 
and defined as follows: 
 Spec.: suitable as a formal specification of the 
EVM language; 
 Exec.:  executable on concrete tests; 
 Certif.: certifiable self-correctness; 
 Verif.: verifiable properties of EVM programs; 
 Debug.: provision of an interactive EVM debugger; 
 Gas: tools for analyzing the gas complexity of an 
EVM program; 
 Level: analysis or verification level of code; 
 Logic: types of essential logic supported; 
 Hybrid: support for hybrid verification methods. 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
We have presented a hybrid formal verification system 
denoted as FSPVM-E, which combines symbolic execution 
and higher-order logic theorem proving for verifying the 
security and reliability of Ethereum-based smart contract 
services. An analysis of past studies indicates that the 
present work represents the first hybrid formal verification 
system implemented in Coq for Ethereum-based smart 
contracts that is applied at the Solidity source code level. 
The foundation of FSPVM-E is a general formal memory 
model that simulates real world memory operations and 
provides a basic pointer arithmetic mechanism. The source 
code of FSPVM-E is Lolisa, which is a large subset of the 
Solidity programming language. Lolisa is strongly typed 
according to GADTs, and includes nearly all of the syntax 
in Solidity. Therefore, the two languages are equivalent, 
which solves the consistency problem in formalization. The 
execution engine of FSPVM-E is FEther, which supports 
static, concolic, and selective symbolic execution 
simultaneously. The execution engine is driven by the 
executable formal semantics of Lolisa, and is able to strictly 
simulate the service behaviors of smart contracts. In 
addition, we provide two assistant tools and two assistant 
libraries to increase the degree of automation in the 
FSPVM-E verification process. Specifically, the two 
assistant tools are a translator and a generator, which are 
respectively applied to automatically translate Solidity into 
Lolisa, and generate specific formal specifications based on 
a specified execution environment. The two assistant 
libraries include a static analysis library and an automation 
tactic library, which are respectively used to scan for 
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standard vulnerabilities in smart contracts, and provide 
fully-automatic execution (verification) tactics. In addition, 
we ensured that FSPVM-E is a trusted verification engine 
by verifying the self-correctness of the core components of 
FSPVM-E in Coq. We have also provided simple case 
studies to demonstrate the novel features of FSPVM-E, 
which include hybrid analysis functions, consistency, 
automation, and high evaluation efficiency. Finally, the 
extensibility and universality of FSPVM-E was 
demonstrated, and a preliminary scheme was proposed to 
systematically extend FSPVM-E to support the verification 
of multiple blockchain platforms. As a result, we can now 
directly verify Ethereum-based service contracts with high 
automation and evaluation efficiency in Coq directly. 
In the future, the Solidity language is still under 
development and is therefore changing quickly, thus the 
Lolisa language will be updated quite often in order to cope 
for that. Besides, we expect to further develop FSPVM-E 
until it is sufficiently powerful and friendly for use by 
general programmers to automatically verify the properties 
of their smart contract programming. First, we are working 
to introduce support for other Solidity features, such as 
inline assembly and float datatype. Second, we will develop 
a trusted translator in Coq directly and certify the 
correctness of it. Third, we will attempt to implement 
support for the EOS (https://eos.io/) blockchain platform. 
Finally, we will design a new verification strategy to 
improve the automation of modular verification in FSPVM-
E. 
APPENDIX 
 
Fig.A. 1. The source code of Smart Sponsor contract. 
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